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Over the course of the past decade corporate governance has grown in importance across the 
institutional landscape. We have witnessed heightened expectation from stakeholders on matters 
of credibility and accountability from those charged with the management of instih1tions. This 
practice is exemplified in the banking sector with the populace demanding more stringent controls 
to ensure that the custodians of their funds are held to the highest standards of accountability. 
However, regardless of the enforcement of rules and principles of corporate governance in the 
banking sector, there have been visible cracks in the area of enforcement, which have led to several 
bank failures. The resultant effect of this is the loss of billions of shillings in depositor funds. This 
paper aims to explore corporate governance in the Kenyan banking sector with a focus on the limits 
ofthe law in its enforcement. 
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The 21st Century has been characterised by an exponential growth in the corporate 
landscape. This has in turn precipitated the growth of regulatory frameworks to ensure the 
proper functioning of these institutions. This state of affairs is exemplified in the banking 
sector with public interest necessitating the implementation of a stringent regulatory 
framework to protect depositor funds . 
It is imperative to point out that corporate governance is not an alien concept. The United 
Kingdom (UK) began implementing codes of corporate governance in 1992 with the 1992 
CadbwJ' Report. 1 The Cadbury Report was authored by the Committee on Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance, now referred to as the Cadbury Committee.2 The 
committee was set up in May 1991 by the Financial Reporting Council and the 
accountancy profession to address the financial aspects of corporate govemance. 3 Sir 
Adrian Cadbury was the chair of the committee. He and this committee produced the 
Cadbury Code, which has since become the comerstone of corporate govemance. 
The code is credited with defining corporate governance as 'the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled' as well as asse1ting that the codes are based on 
principles of accountability, openness and integrity. 4 Perhaps the most significant factor 
in the elevated status of corporate governance globally was the collapse of a number of 
high profile companies. 5 This can in large part be linked to the many instances of conflicts 
of interest amongst the members of boards mnning companies. 
1 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992. 
2 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992. 
3 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para. 2.1 . 
4 Report of the Conunittee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 2.5 
and 3.2. 
5 Aras G and Crowther D, A handbook of corporate governance and social responsibility, Routledge, New 
York, 131-132. 
Initially, complying with the rules was optional for the companies but this was later 
changed by the requirement from the London Stock Exchange that companies 'comply or 
explain' hence conferring the rules with statutory force .6 The principle of comply or 
explain refers to a mechanism that combines voluntary compliance with corporate 
governance codes and a legal obligation to declare compliance with or explain deviations 
from a code. 7 Essentially, companies may choose not to apply the code and instead just 
give a description of their corporate governance practices. Kenya has essentially adopted 
the same 'comply or explain' approach with the exception that there exists some 
mandatory rules. 8 The rules of corporate governance that apply in the country have been 
set out in the Code of Corporate Governance for Issuers of Securities to the Public (20 15) 
issued by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) through a gazetted notice.9 This was the 
result of a collaborative effmi between the CMA, the World Bank Corporate Governance 
team and the Intemational Finance Corporation's (IFC) Africa Corporate Governance 
Program. 10 
Despite the promulgation of these rules and principles, Kenya has witnessed the collapse 
of at least three mid-tier banks: Dubai, 11 Imperial 12 and Chase. 13 These failures can largely 
be attributed to lapses in the corporate governance framework. The failure of Chase Bank 
can be narrowed down to irregular insider lending at the behest of the directors while the 
straw that broke the camel's back at Imperial Bank was a conspiracy between bank 
officials to defraud depositors. 14 
6 University of Cambridge, Judge Business School, the Cadbury Report: 
http: //cadbury.cjbs.archios.info/report on 13 June 2018. 
7 Fasterling B, 'The Comply or Explain Approach: Company Law's Conformist Transparency' 23(2) 
Reveu Jnternationale De Droit Economique, 2009, 129. 
8 The Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public 2015, The Capital 
Markets Act (Cap 485A), Gazette Notice No 1420, para 2.1. 
9 Kenya Gazette Notice No 1420, March 4 2016. 
10 Njuguna A, 'The evolution of corporate governance and consequent domestication in Kenya' 7 
International Journal of Business and Social Science 5, 2016, 160. 
11 Joshua Masinde, 'CBK orders closure ofDubai Bank,' Daily Nation, 24 August 2015. 
12 Quartz Africa, Exotic holidays, gifts and the 380 million dollar fraud that brought down a Kenyan bank: 
https://qz.com/864182/exotic-holidays-gifts-and-the-380-million-fraud-that-brought-down-a-kenyan-
bank/ on 13 June 2018. 
13 Mutuma Mathiu, 'Gloom for depositors as Chase Bank collapses,' Daily Nation, 7 April2016. 
14 Daily Nation, 'How whistleblower's secret note to investors brought Chase Bank to its knees' April 10 
2016. 
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The failure of these banks has not only impacted depositors negatively but has affected 
the banking sector in its entirety. These cases have a direct linkage with the moratorium 
that is cuiTently in place instituted by the Central Bank of Kenya on the licencing of new 
banks in Kenya. 15 
The purpose of this study is to address the failures evident in the banking sector 
attributable to laxity in the corporate governance regime. The paper will interrogate the 
merits and efficacy of the code of corporate governance bearing in mind the limitations 
of the law in enforcing it. The paper will hypothesize on whether an incentive-based 
approach to the question may not in reality be more successful than the rule-based 
approach currently in effect. 
The need for a robust corporate govemance framework can be justified by the growth of 
instih1tions and the need by the public that its interests be protected. The literature on the 
topic has increased exponentially in tandem with the growing number of institutions. The 
theories on what makes an efficient corporate govemance framework have also 
mushroomed globally. This paper aims to explore the various facets that impact the 
spectrum of corporate governance with a view to getting a better understanding of the 
corporate governance landscape in the country. 
1.2.Problem Statement 
The 'comply or explain' framework, a mechanism that combines voluntary compliance 
with corporate governance codes and a legal obligation to declare compliance with or 
explain deviations from a code, is a part of the narrow self-regulatory approach taken by 
Kenya and has failed to forestall the collapse of banking institutions such as Dubai Bank, 
Imperial Bank and Chase Bank. The failures of these banks are directly attributable to the 
nan·ow self-regulatory approach. 
1.3.Hypothesis 
The collapse of banking institutions such as Dubai Bank, Imperial Bank and Chase Bank 
is attributable to a naiTow self-regulation approach to corporate governance. 
15 Central Bank of Kenya, Declaration ofMoratoriwn on Licencing of Banks, 17 November 2015 . 
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1.4.Research Objectives 
a. To analyse the existing corporate governance regulatory regime in Kenya in order 
to demonstrate that it takes a narrow self-regulatory approach. 
b. To prove a link between Kenya's narrow self-regulatory approach to corporate 
governance and the collapse of banking institutions such as Dubai Bank, Imperial 
Bank and Chase Bank. 
c. To demonstrate the contrast between a self-regulatory approach and a govermnent 
regulation approach. 
J.S.Research Questions 
a. What is the existing corporate governance regulatory regime in Kenya? 
b. Is there a link between Kenya's narrow self-regulatory approach to corporate 
governance and the collapse ofbanking institutions such as Dubai bank, Imperial 
Bank and Chase Bank? 
c. What is the difference between a self-regulatory approach to corporate governance 
and a government regulation approach? 
1.6.Methodology 
This study will employ a number of methods in order to collect the information necessary 
from which to draw conclusions. These shall constitute qualitative, quantitative, co-
relational and meta-analysis. These methods have been chosen as the author believes they 
will be of assistance in the different facets of this sh1dy. 
The qualitative method will utilise observations and document review where necessary. 
This will be useful in assessing the current status of corporate governance regimes in 
Kenya as well as across the globe. Observation will be necessary in evaluating the current 
corporate governance practices across Kenya and what impact they have had on 
institutions that employ them. It will be necessary, as well, in gauging whether the 
political climate across the region will be a suitable incubator for the implementation of 
an incentive-based approach. Document review will be the most extensively used research 
method as it will offer crucial infonnation on how an incentive-based approach has been 
employed in other jmisdictions, its efficacy and pitfalls as well as how best to adapt it to 
our situation. 
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To achieve this, the study will dedicate a chapter to a comparative study of corporate 
governance regulation in the US, UK and Kenya. The comparative study will facilitate an 
inquiry into the practicality of any proposed approach from an implementation 
perspective. 
The author in analysing the cause and effect aspects of this study will employ the co-
relational analysis. An example of this will be in detennining the relation that the 
employment of the incentive-based approach would have on institutional policies or how 
it might affect public confidence and as a result positively increase investment and number 
of investors and depositors. The author acquiesces that this means will generate 
projections and inferences hence cannot be 100% accurate but will offer a picture of the 
landscape after the implementation of an incentive-based approach to corporate 
govemance. 
The author will lastly employ the use of meta-analysis in this study. This will allow the 
synthesis of data from multiple studies and aim to draw a single conclusion from them. 
The author foresees the need to employ this method in assessing the attendant pitfalls of 
an incentive-based approach as well as in analysing the success in its implementation. 
1. 7.Literature Review 
In analysing the literature on corporate governance, the study proposes to use a three-
pronged approach. This paper will begin by defining the status quo of corporate 
governance across Kenya. This will be in the first section comprising three sub-sections. 
The first will attempt to elucidate the meaning of corporate governance as it is understood 
globally; the second will explore the visage that corporate governance has taken in Kenya 
and the third will attempt to review the pitfalls and failings of the current system of 
corporate governance. 
The second part will have two sub-sections: the first will explore the meaning of an 
incentive-based approach as proposed in this paper and the second will highlight the 
rationale behind the push for its implementation. The last section will delve into the 
justification for the implementation of an incentive-based corporate governance regime 
in our jurisdiction. It will explore the impediments and challenges in the implementation 
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of an incentive-based approach and the steps that should be taken for it to succeed. The 
author aims to present a comprehensive yet concise study that seeks to evaluate whether 
an incentive-based approach would cure the current ills that pervade corporate governance 
in the country. 
1. 7.1. Understanding the meaning of corporate governance 
The status of corporations across the globe has significantly risen in the past decade. It is 
at odds with the view previously taken of the responsibilities and liabilities of corporations 
and institutions. We have moved fmiher and further away from the likes of Sir Edward 
Cooke who asserted that ' corporations cannot commit treason nor be outlawed as they 
have no souls' . 16 The public believe that corporations are responsible and liable and if 
there be a hangman's noose then they should not be exempt from the gallows. The 
question that now plagues those who cry foul at the actions of corporations is how to 
ensure that justice is meted out against an entity that only exists in the realm of the law. 
Coglianese opined that the answer to this conundrum will assume the form of improved 
govemment controls in the manner of refom1ed regulatory systems as well as an 
improvement in law enforcement. 17 
The Cadbury Report of 1992 defined corporate governance as 'the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled' .18 The OECD added to this definition by surmising 
that corporate govemance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring perfom1ance 
are detennined. 19 The initial purpose of codes of corporate govemance and their 
implementation was to promote a higher standard of governance and strove to ensure that 
boards of directors were efficient and accountable in the discharge of their duties. Gakeri 
proposes that the evidence from developed jurisdictions indicates that this efficiency is 
inextricably linked to the legal and regulatory framework in place.20 These sentiments 
16 Case of Sutton 's hospital (1612), United Kingdom Court of Excheqeur. 
17 Coglianese C, Healey T., Keating E and Michael M, 'The role of government in corporate governance,' 
John F Kennedy School of Government, 2004. 
18 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 2.5 
and 3.2. 
19 OECD, Principles of corporate governance, 2004. 
20 Gakeri J, 'Enhancing Kenya's securities markets through corporate governance: Challenges and 
opportunities, 3(6) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2013, 94-117 . 
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echo those of the Institute of Directors South Africa m their assertion that good 
governance and the law cannot be separated. 21 
1. 7.2. The Link between Corporate Governance and Bank Failure 
The claim that bank failure and corporate governance failure are inextricably linked is by 
no means far-fetched and there is sufficient literature to back it. Good corporate 
governance is vital for any company and banks are no exception. In fact, there exists the 
argument that due to the differences in the economics and functions of banks from other 
industrial firms, banks are prone to more stringent regulation of their capital and risk. 22 
These differences are also reflected in corporate governance of banks which include; high 
powered incentives (discussed in this paper) among others. 23 
The financial crisis in 2007 serves to highlight the importance of corporate governance to 
banks more than anything else. Several fact-finding studies have concluded that the poor 
corporate governance of banks was one of the major causes ofthe financial crisis.24 The 
G20, the European Union and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants all 
came to the same conclusion; 'corporate governance failure was one of the most important 
failures of the crisis. ' 25 
There is no doubt of course that there were many other factors contributing to the financial 
crisis; low interest rates, high leverage, misallocation of investment, unsatisfactory rating 
practices, insufficient supervision by financial regulators.26 However, given the studies 
cited above it is impossible to ignore the link between corporate govemance failure and 
bank failure given what happened in the financial crisis of 2007. Concunently, analysis 
on Zimbabwe's unprecedented catastrophic financial failure between 2003 and 2009 
provides further evidence on the link between bank failure and corporate governance 
failure. The study conducted on Zimbabwe sought to find out if there existed any link at 
21 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, Draft code of governance principles for South Aji·ica, 2009. 
22 Mi.ilbert P, 'Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis - Theory, Evidence, 
Reforms',2010, 3, ECGI Law Working Paper 130/2009, <http://ssrn.com/abstract= l448118> 
23 Mi.ilbert P, 'Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis- Theory, Evidence, Refonns',3 . 
24 Mi.ilbert P, 'Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis- Theory, Evidence, Refonns',9 . 
25 Mi.ilbert P, 'Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis- Theory, Evidence, Refonns',9. 
26 Rose C, 'The Relationship Between Corporate Governance Characteristics and Credit Exposure in Banks: 
Implications for Financial Regulation' 43 Eurpoean Journal of Law and Economics 1, 2017, 167. 
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all between bank performance, let alone bank failure, and corporate governance. Their 
findings were surmised thus; 'there is enough evidence to conclude that corporate 
governance has a positive relationship with commercial banks in Zimbabwe. ' 27 The same 
can be said of corporate governance anywhere as seen with the reports on the financial 
crisis of 2007; its failure inevitably leads to bank failure. 
1. 7.3. Corporate Governance in Kenya 
The corporate governance sphere in Kenya borrows heavily from the code of corporate 
governance in the UK, with the forn1er mirroring the latter to a fault. Currently, Kenya's 
corporate governance regime is regulated by The Code of Corporate Governance for 
Issuers of Securities to the Public (20 15). It was issued by the Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA) and was the result of a collaborative effort between the CMA, the World Bank 
Corporate Governance team and the IFC's Africa Corporate Governance Program. 28 The 
Code enshrines the same principles extoled by the UK's Cadbury report and is in large 
pari purely suggestive but for a small set of mandatory rules. This includes but is not 
limited to: 
• that there be a clear division of responsibilities at the top, primarily that the position of 
Chairman of the Board be separated from that of CEO, or that there be a strong 
independent element on the board; 
• that the majority of the Board be comprised of external directors; 
• that remuneration committees for Board members be made up in the majority of non-
executive directors; and 
• that the Board should appoint an Audit Committee including at least tlU'ee non-
executive directors. 29 
27 Njuguna A, 'The evolution of corporate governance and consequent domestication in Kenya' 7(5) 
International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2016, 160. 
28 Njuguna A, 'The evolution of corporate governance and consequent domestication in Kenya' 7(5) 
International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2016, 160. 
29 The Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public 2015, The Capital 
Markets Act (Cap 485A), Gazette Notice No 1420, para 2.1. 
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Before Kenya adopted and instituted the code of corporate governance, guaranteeing 
accountability in the public sector was alien; this situation only changed following the 
1 iberalisation of the economy in the 1990's. 30 The situation at the time can aptly be defined 
as institutionalised inefficiency. It was riddled with the failures of various corporations 
amongst them 33 banks in the 1980's alone. 31 
An attempt to rectify this and guard against the failure of other banks came in the form of 
the promulgation of the Code of Corporate Governance for Public Listed Companies in 
2002 the impetus of which was a corporate scanda1.32 However the failure of this code can 
be attributed to its practical inefficiency that was in part a result of the leniency in the 
penalties provided for flouting the rules. 
I. 7. 4. Pitfalls of the Current Corporate Governance Regime in Kenya 
We fix things because we reach the concl.usion that they are not functioning as they are. A 
paper of this nature would be unnecessary if we perceived that the current corporate 
govemance struchtre was living up to the public ' s expectations. However, the current 
moratorium on the licencing of new banks in Kenya that has been in place since 2015 seems 
to point to the converse. 33 The moratorium was instituted by the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) after the failure of Chase Bank, Dubai Bank and Imperial Bank with the rationale 
being that it would allow the time required to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory 
framework of the CBK with regard to its oversight role in the banking sector. 
It may be of use to the discussion to isolate and attempt a focused view on the factors that 
evenhmlly influenced the collapse of the three banking institutions. Gathaiya surmised the 
factors that led to the eventual collapse of Chase Bank could be distilled to the twin factors 
of failure to meet the statutory capital adequacy ratio and under-reporting of insider loans.34 
30 Dignam A, 'Exporting corporate governance: UK regulatory system in a global economy', 21(3) Comp 
L, 2000, 70-72. 
31 Musikali M, 'The law affecting corporate governance in Kenya: A need for review', 19(7) Social Science 
Research Network, 2008 . 
32 DuPlessis J, Hargovan A, Harris J and Mirko B, 'Principles of contemporary corporate governance ', 
2005, 6-7. 
33 Central Bank of Kenya, Declaration of Moratorium on Licencing of Banks, 17 November 2015. 
34 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016', 7(3) 
International Journal of Management and Business Studies, 2017, 9. 
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The insider loans totalled Ksh. 13.62 billon which was in sharp contrast to the official 
reported figure ofKsh. 5.72 billion.35 This ultimately led to the inability of the bank to meet 
its financial obligations and its being placed in receivership in April 2016. 
The fall ofDubai Bank was in many ways similar in fonn to that of Chase Bank. The Bank 
was established in Kenya in 1982 and was eventually placed in receivership in August 2015 
by the Central Bank of Kenya. 36 This was a result of deficiencies in capital and liquidity: 
the bank had been breaching its daily cash reserve ratio. 37 The Bank also failed to honour 
some of its financial obligations such as paying off the debt it owed to the Bank of Africa. 
This eventually saw its liquidation after an assessment indicating that the magnitude of its 
problem placed it outside the realm of salvation. 38 
Imperial Bank commenced operation as a commercial banking service provider in the year 
1996. As of December 2013, the bank ranked as the 191h largest Kenyan bank with its assets 
totalling 43 billion Kenyan shillings. 39 The fall of the bank begun in 2015 when the CBK 
placed it under statutory management. The bank was placed in receivership owing to unsafe 
and unsound practices and conditions of transacting business. 40 In 2016, NIC Bank was 
eventually selected as the asset and liability consultant for Imperial Bank and was made 
responsible for returning funds to the depositors of Imperial Bank.41 
These isolated incidents are indicators of a far greater malady that lies at the heart of the 
corporate governance framework in the country. A weak and ineffectual regulatory and 
supervisory framework is one of the key stumbling blocks that may contribute to the fall of 
banks. An instructive way to highlight this is to analyse the oversight mechanisms deployed 
by a bank. Dubai Bank is a case in point, by the time it was collapsing it had only three 
directors overseeing its monitoring.42 
35 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016 ' ,9. 
36 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016 ',9. 
37 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016 ',9. 
38 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 20 15 to 2016 ',9. 
39 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016' ,9. 
40 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016 ',9. 
41 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016 ' ,9. 
42 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016 ', 11 . 
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Another factor that plays a major role in determining the success or failure of a bank rests 
on transparency and disclosure. From the case of Chase Bank, we see that this was the 
Achilles' Heel of its eventual collapse. The bank chose to under report non-performing 
loans as well as employing special purpose vehicles to siphon billions of shillings.43 This 
undennined one ofthe three principles of corporate governance, opetmess, and the Bank's 
failure was inevitable. 
The issue of integrity is also brought to the fore when analysing the failure of these banks. 
The founder and chairman of Dubai Bank, Hassan Zubeidi, accumulated vast wealth 
through irregular insider lending that he subsequently covered up by doctoring the books 
of account. This state of affairs was replicated at Chase Bank where the Chairman and his 
co-Director were found to have drawn funds from the lender and funnelled them to the 
entities they co-owned.44 The CBK eventually seized property worth Ksh. 7.9 billion 
camouflaged as Joint Islamic Ventures. These properties were eventually charged to Chase 
Bank paving the way for the re-opening of the bank.45 
1. 7. 5. Incentive-based Approach to Corporate Governance 
The 'comply or explain' framework falls shott of its mandate because it does not give 
sufficient impetus for companies or institutions to comply. Other than the mandatory laws 
that are given force through statute, the other rules serve at best as pointed suggestions 
towards giving leeway for companies to decide whether or not to be bound. The import of 
an incentive-based approach is that it offers sufficient reason to entice compliance from 
institutions. The current incentive that is linked to company listing in the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange allows corporations to disregard the laws with impunity or flout them at will. 
The following sections will attempt to explore the rationale behind incentive-based 
corporate governance and the fmm that it would take if it is to be effective. 
43 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016 ', 11. 
44 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016', 11. 
45 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016 ', 11. 
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1. 7. 6. Understanding incentive-based corporate governance 
Incentive is defined as a thing that motivates someone to do something.46 There are two 
distinct forms of incentives, positive incentive and negative incentive with the fonner being 
the more popular. A negative incentive will penalise bad behaviour whereas a positive 
incentive rewards good behaviour. The cunent structure of corporate governance has opted 
to lean heavily towards the application of positive reinforcement. Listing on the NSE as the 
carrot-dangling-on-a-stick as reward for complying with the rules set out in the code of 
corporate governance is one such tactic of positive reinforcement. This paper recognises 
that incentives are in fact in use as a means of effecting corporate governance however it 
proposes that the employment of negative incentives may yield more success than is 
ctmently seen in the banking sector. The grounding of this theory lies under the ambit of 
behavioural economics and the theory of loss aversion. The theory of loss aversion states 
that people would go to twice the length to avoid losses than to ensure gainsY The theory 
has been used to supp01t the assertion that penalty frames may be more effective than 
reward frames in motivating people.48 
The inspiration for this approach may be credited largely to the Code of Hammurabi. The 
code was set out by King Hammurabi about 4000 years ago and was one of the first sets of 
laws.49 The import of the code to the discussion does not rest as much on the laws it set out 
but rather the incentives it provided to ensure that they were adhered to. Of note are the 
construction laws and the penalties they set out; these were designed to ensure that 
contractors built safe homes. The underpinning rationale set out that for each life lost due 
to a fault in consh-uction, a life would be owed. An example is law which provided that if 
a house collapsed and killed the occupant of the home, the builder would be put to death. 50 
The lesson that the Code of Hammurabi brings to modem corporate govemance is that 
steeper penalties engender better practices. Nassim Taleeb echoed these sentiments by 
46 bttps://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/incentive on 7 July 2018. 
47 Kahneman D and Tversky A, 'Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk', 47(2) Econometrica, 
1979,47. 
48 Giichter S, Orzen H. , Renner E and Starmer C, 'Are experimental economists prone to framing effects? 
A natural field experiment' , Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 2009, 70. 
49 https :/lf.~.blog/2017 /11/hammurabis-code/ on 7 July 2018. 
50 https://fs.blog/20 17 /11/hammurabis-code/ on 7 July 2018. 
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stating that the banking sector may perform better if in place of rewarding institutions with 
bonuses we ought to penalise bankers for threatening public well-being; this would foster 
the creation of wider margins of safety and avert a greater number of banking disasters. 51 
Negative incentives necessitate the creation of penalties and consequences that are 
commensurate to the failures and crimes committed. The question now is whether such 
penalties should take a mandatory or voluntary form. Mandatory penalties would be legal 
or regulatory while voluntary penalties would be self-regulatory. This study opines that if 
these incentives are to be effective, they must have the force of the law backing them as 
this will be the surest way to guarantee that the impact is significant enough to invite risk 
aversion and encourage better banking practices. 
I . 7. 7. The Current Place of the Law in Corporate Governance 
The main laws that would come into play in remedying ills of corporate governance would 
be: The Companies Act, The Capital Markets Act, the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) 
Rules and the Penal Code. The system of courts in Kenya have been given the mandate to 
hear and detennine any contravention of sections that are found in the above Acts. The 
strength of the legal regime would be a large factor in detennining the effectiveness of any 
penalties imposed under the law; it is thus necessary for the efficacy of the legal regime 
that the means of enforcement be in a position to dispense justice in a timely maimer. 
However, Ndlovu points out that courts are the last recourse sought by shareholders when 
issues of corporate governance arise. 52 This may be ath·ibuted to the lack of confidence in 
the judicial system when handling matters of this nature. One of the greatest impediments 
with regards to the setting up of effective legislation is the outdated nature of the Companies 
Act. 53 A review of the laws as well as regard to their enforcement through legal channels 
is necessary if the legal system is to be utilised as the bastion of negative incentive for 
51 https: //f.-; .blog/2017/11/hammurabis-code/ on 7 July 2018. 
52 Ndlovu M, Bhiri T, Mutambanadzo T, and Hlahla B, 'A comparative analysis of the corporate governance 
practices in multinational and domestic banks in Zimbabwe', 4(5) Journal of Emerging Trends in 
Economics and Management Sciences, 2013,473-480. 
53 Atieno Y, (2009). 'Corporate governance problems facing Kenyan parastatals: A case study of the sugar 
industry', Bucerius Law School, 2009 - http://www.gbv.de/dms/buls/631006060.pdf on 9 July 2018. 
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banks. The success of such an endeavour is as well heavily dependent on courts having the 
requisite resources to handle the cases as well as a sufficient tmderstanding of the legal 
rules in the banking sector so as to. enforce the law. These qualities are lacking in the judicial 
sector of our country as it presently stands. 
1. 8. Justification 
The 2P1 century has seen the need to give souls to corporations, contrary to the standpoint 
extolled by Sir Edward Cooke. 54 This is in large pati owed to the increased role of 
corporations and banks in the modem economy. A failure to effectively regulate and 
enforce corporate govemance rules could precipitate market failure resulting in large losses 
to the economy. As can already be seen from the failure of Chase Bank, Imperial Bank and 
Dubai, Bank failures in corporate governance can be credited to the downfall of even strong 
institutions.55 This study proposes that the self-regulatory mechanism of corporate 
govemance currently employed lacks the power to ensure that banks and corporations 
comply. This has seen the skirting of these rules with impunity and in the process placing 
depositors in precarious positions when funds are lost. This study opines that the best 
recourse to this state of affairs is to replace the current use of positive-incentives in favour 
of negative-incentives. These negative incentives would assume the form ofthe imposition 
of legal penalties in cases of failure to comply with the set-out rules of corporate 
govemance. This hypothesis is backed by the theory of loss aversion that provides that 
people tend to put in more effort to avoid losses than they do to amass gains. 
1.9. Chapter Breakdown 
This proposal shall serve as the introductory chapter to the thesis as it outlines the 
background to the research problem, the research problem, the hypothesis, the literature 
review, the conceptual framework and the approach and methodology. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
will seek to answer the 3 research questions listed above. Chapter 2 will comprehensively 
analyse the existing corporate govemance regulatory regime in Kenya in order to 
54 Case of Sutton's hospital (1612), United Kingdom Court of Exchequer. 
55 Gathaiya R, 'Analysis of issues affecting collapsed banks in Kenya from year 2015 to 2016',14. 
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demonstrate that it takes a narrow self-regulatory approach. Chapter 3 will discuss theories 
of corporate governance so as to give perspectives on the best regulatory approach to 
corporate governance. Chapter 4 will look into international best practice and to do so it 
will undertake a comparative study of the UK, the US and Kenya to find the best regulatory 
approach to corporate governance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Corporate Governance and the State 
2. I. Introduction 
From the foregoing discussion in Chapter One, we can see that the law govermng 
corporate governance in Kenya has its limits. This evinced by the 'comply or explain' 
framework, a mechanism that combines voluntary compliance with corporate governance 
codes and a legal obligation to declare compliance with or explain deviations from a code, 
together with the rules of corporate governance in the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Issuers of Securities to the Public 2016 issued by the Capital Markets Authority failing to 
forestall the collapse of banking institutions such as Dubai Bank, Imperial Bank and 
Chase Bank. The failures of these banks are in my view directly attributable to the limits 
of the law in corporate governance. Corporate governance has not had its limits solely in 
Kenya but throughout its development globally. For this reason, this chapter presents the 
historical development of corporate governance to illustrate these limitations and the 
resultant efforts to counter these limitations in the likes ofthe Cad bury Report, Greenburg 
Repoti and the Hampel Repoti. The historical development of corporate governance will 
be covered in the first section of this chapter. 
The second section of this chapter will then address the development of corporate 
governance in Kenya as an analysis of the corporate governance regime in the banking 
sector and its failings and ought to begin with a historical perspective. This section will 
attempt to give the background of corporate governance in Kenya and its gradual adoption 
in the banking sector; it will fmiher attempt to delve into the nuanced changes that have 
been implemented over time to address rising concerns emerging in the market. It will 
also highlight how corporate governance in Kenya basically adopted the UK corporate 
govemance regime as a result of the colonial past. 
The third section of this chapter will analyse the efficacy of the cunent corporate 
governance regime in its implementation while highlighting some of its successes as well 
as failures. The penultimate section of this chapter will analyse the collapse of Chase 
Bank, Imperial Bank and Dubai Bank in an attempt to look at the practical implications 
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of an ineffective corporate governance framework in the banking sector. The conclusion 
will show the link between bank failure and poor corporate governance. 
2.2. The Development of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has been an issue since the 1600's when Queen Elizabeth I granted 
the first royal charter to the East Indian Company. 56 The basic issues of power and 
accountability for use of power as well as the governance structures of the company are 
not too different from what we have today. 57 On the governance stmcture of managers 
and owners, Adam Smith, in the 18th Century pointed out that the directors of corporations 
being managers of other people's money rather than their own, cannot be expected to 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance as if it were their own. 58 Today corporate 
governance is still concerned with the same issue of bringing the interests of owners and 
managers into line. 59 
In the UK, corporate govemance became a major issue in the period between the 1980s 
and 1990s that witnessed the collapse of a number of institutions, which included the 
Fen·anti International PLC, Colorol Group, Pollypeck International PLC, Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI) and Maxwell Communication Corporation courtesy 
of the lack of a strong corporate governance framework. 60 This led to the British 
government appointing several committees to investigate corporate governance and the 
reports of these committees have had a tremendous impact on the development of 
corporate governance worldwide. 61 These reports were translated into new laws and 
56 Akwasi R, 'Corporate Governance and Financial Perfomance: Evidence from the Ghanian Banking 
Sector' PHD Thesis, University of Bradford, 16. 
57 Akwasi R, 'Corporate Governance and Financial Perfomance: Evidence from the Ghanian Banking 
Sector', 16. 
58 Malin C, C01porate Governance, 19. 
59 Abor J and Biekpe N, 'Corporate Governance and The Small and Medium Enterprise Sector: Theory and 
Implications. 7(2) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 2007. 
60 University of Cambridge, Judge Business School, the Cadbury Report 
.http://cadbury.cjbs.archios.info/report on 29 August 2018 on 29 August 2018. 
61 Akwasi R, 'Corporate Governance and Financial Perfomance: Evidence from the Ghanian Banking 
Sector', 16. 
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regulations showing the limitations of the existing corporate governance mechanisms. 62 
The committees and their reports are discussed below. 
2.3. The Cadbury Code 
The Cad bury Code marked the beginnings of codified corporate governance. The drawing 
of the code itself was at the behest of the London Stock Exchange after the failure of a 
number of banking institutions in the 1980's which shook the public's confidence in 
financial reporting as well as the ability of external auditors to provide assmance on the 
financial conditions of the companies they were tasked to report on. 63 It was on the 
foundation of these concerns that a committee was established under the leadership of Sir 
Adrian Cadbury with the aim of looking into allegations that financial repotiing by 
companies was plagued by the malaise of 'window dressing' .64 The committee, however, 
broadened its scope and attempted to set out in writing a code of best practice that was to 
inforn1 the expected standards of financial reporting and auditing as well as the attendant 
responsibilities of all those mandated to ensure that those standards were met. This was 
eventually reflected in a Code of Best Practice, which may be heralded as the first attempt 
to codify already recognised practices and render them universally applicable as well as 
offer added incentive for companies to adhere to them. 65 
In an attempt to preserve the independence of the board of directors the code was 
presented to companies as being voluntary but with the caveat that companies should 
explain in their annual reports the extent of their compliance as well as any reasons for 
non-compliance. 66 What really created the impetus for companies to adopt the rules was 
two-fold: firstly, in line with the recommendations set out in the Cadbury Code, the 
London Stock Exchange required the presentation of a certificate of compliance or non-
compliance the result of which would determine company listing on the stock exchange; 
62 Akwasi R, 'Corporate Governance and Financial Perfomance: Evidence from the Ghanian Banking 
Sector', 16. 
63 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 2.1. 
64 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 2.1. 
65 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 1. 7. 
66 Report ofthe Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 3.7 . 
18 
secondly, investors sponsoring and advising listed companies put pressure on them to 
adopt the principles as set out. 
The Cadbury Report centred on two main aspects: the provisions guiding the board of 
directors and the accounts of the company. The code was faced with the dilemma of 
determining whether to allocate more rights to the shareholders as opposed to the board 
of directors. It however provided that it would be inappropriate for the shareholders to 
usurp powers from the directors and maintained that the directors should retain their 
essential powers. 67 However, as a means to protect the rights of the shareholders, the code 
required accountability from the directors to the shareholders on decisions made.68 This 
was intended to curb to an extent the previously arbitrary and at times tyrannical rule of 
the directors over company affairs . 
One of the drawbacks carried forward from family-owned compames was the 
concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals usually in the fonn of the CEO 
or the managing director. To cure this ill, it was necessary that the report addresses the 
issue of the exercise of control by the company. In this spirit, the code set out that the 
control of the company should be exercised collectively by the entire board and not 
dominated by a few individuals. 69 The code fut1her recommended that there be a clear 
division between the decisions to be made by the executive management and those that 
should be left to the board. The rationale of this was that in the absence of such a line, 
executive management would usurp the powers of the board of directors. Further, in the 
spirit of limiting powers, the code included a strong recommendation that there exists a 
clear demarcation between the role of the chairperson and the CEO with the 
responsibilities of each clearly defined. 70 However, in the event this was not the case, the 
code recommended that there exists a powerful independent counterbalance on the board 
to aid in diluting the power.71 
67 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 3.4. 
68 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 3.4. 
69 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 4.1. 
70 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 4.9. 
71 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 4.9. 
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The Code further addressed the question of the company accounts. On this issue it put 
forth the suggestion that companies should have an audit committee. The purpose of this 
committee would be to provide a fomm for the discussion of audit issues as well as to 
review interim and annual financial statements before their submission to the board. 72 The 
code initially saw this as an opportunity for the creation of an intermediary between the 
board and the external auditors as opposed to having to deal with them directly as had 
been previously. Interestingly enough, one of the recommendations of the code that had 
to be significantly watered down clue to the hostility it generated was that the directors 
should report to the shareholders the entire system of internal control. 73 This was 
vehemently opposed and was finally included in its diminutive: that the directors would 
only report on internal financial controls. 74 The Caclbury Report while making strides in 
addressing the major issues in corporate governance still left quite a number of areas with 
unresolved issues. This may have informed the Green bury Report of 1995 that followed. 
2.4. The Greenbury Report 
The Greenbury Repoti that was to compliment the Caclbury Report was as a result of 
public outrage against the remuneration of company directors. It had been the norn1 for 
directors to award themselves large sums of money at their discretion. This problem was 
particularly endemic following the privatisation of public companies that further 
highlighted the benefits enjoyed by directors in stark contrast to the quality of services 
provided to the public. Further, it was noted, to the chagrin of the populace that there 
seemed to exist no link between the directors' remuneration and the perfmmance of the 
company. There was thus no incentive for the directors to improve the companies' 
standing as they were well compensated regardless of perfonnance. It was against this 
background that Sir Richard Greenbury became the chainnan of the committee that was 
constituted to look into the issue of directors' remuneration and come up with viable 
proposals. 75 In contrast to the Cad bury Report, which was largely well received, the 
72 Report of the Cotmnittee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 
4.35. 
73 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 6.6. 
74 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, para 6.8. 
75 Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, July 1995, 
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Greenbury Report received mixed reviews, since the predominant perception was that it 
missed the mark in addressing the key issues. 
The report spoke to aspects of remuneration and how companies could skilfully address 
these potential minefields. The report begun by recommending that remuneration of 
executive directors should be detennined by non-executive directors to address conflict 
of interest. 76 The report in attempting to come up with remuneration policies while at the 
same time remaining politically correct by not stepping on anyone's toes, set a number of 
well-meaning principles that lost all efficacy in their implementation owing to their 
vagueness. Some of the provisions stated that directors' remuneration should not be 
excessive, that there be a direct link between shareholder interests and directors' interests, 
share amounts to directors should not be offered at a discount among other 
considerations.77 The report further suggested that there be full disclosure provided for 
directors' remuneration. All this information, it was recommended, should be set out in 
detail in an annual report. 78 
2.5. The Hampel Report 
The Hampel Report was compiled in 1998 and was meant to progress the work begun by 
the other two committees. It can perhaps best be credited with the recommendation that 
the principles set out in the preceding reports should be codified into a single document, 
this became the 1998 Combined Code. 79 Further, the Hampel Report reiterated the use of 
principles as opposed to tules with the rationale being that what would work would to a 
large extent depend on the situation. Therefore, each situation had to be appraised in line 
with its uniqueness in trying to detem1ine what should be applicable. The Hampel Report 
further attempted to give a positive dimension to the principles it recommended in a 
deviation from the two previous repotis that primarily focused on deterrence. The Hampel 
Report essentially echoed what had already been stated in the Cadbury and Greenbury 
Reports. 
76 Report ofthe Cmmnittee on Corporate Governance, January 1998, para 4.8 and 4.11. 
77 Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, January 1998, para 6.5 and 6.7. 
78 Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, January 1998, para 5.8 and 5.12. 
79 Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, January 1998. 
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2. 6. The 1998 Combined Report 
The Combined Report brought together and unified the recommendations of the Cadbury, 
Greenbury and the Hampel Reports. The code was divided into two sections with the first 
setting out principles that dealt with companies and the second proposing a code of 
practice for institutional investors. 80 The stock exchange in an attempt to inspire 
compliance with the rules has required companies to provide two documents the first 
stating how it has applied the rules set out in section one of the code and the second 
whether it has complied with the rules set out and if so during which period of time and 
which specific principles. The Combined Report can perhaps be credited best for 
cementing the 'comply or explain' approach to corporate govemance, which is prevalent 
today. 
2. 7. Subsequent Reports 
While the reports identified above set the foundation of corporate govemance in the UK, 
the work was far from over and subsequent reports were commissioned and added to the 
body of recommendations. The Tumbull Report of 1999 followed the combined report 
and its main aim was to make directors responsible for risk management in the interest of 
protecting the interests of the shareholders while remaining conscious of how much risk 
they could reasonably handle. 81 Following this was the Directors' Remuneration Report 
Regulations of 2002 that necessitated the preparation of annual remuneration reports that 
would prescribe remuneration policy as well as provide disclosure on directors' 
remuneration. The Higgs Report was subsequently released in 2002 with the aim of 
making non-executive directors more effective. 82 It was closely followed by the Smith 
Report of 2003, which was intended to give companies guidelines on how to make 
arrangements for their audit committees. 83 
80 http ://web.msu.ac.zw/eleaming/materiai/1455219768Summary%20ofllu20Codes.pdf 268, on 29 August 
2018. 
81 http:i/web.msu.ac .zw/elearning/material!I 455219768Summary%20of%20Codes.pdf 270, on 29 August 
2018. 
82 http :l/web.msu.ac.zw/eleaming/material/1 455219768Summary%20of%20Codes.pdf 271, on 29 August 
2018. 
83 ht-tp ://web.msu.ac.zw/eleaming/material!J 455219768Summary%20of%20Codes.pdf 272, on 29 August 
2018. 
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The 2003 Combined Code may perhaps illustrate the crown in the corporate governance 
regime. The revised code included the recommendations from the reports that superseded 
the Hampel Report. Although the code is longer than the 1998 version, the principles 
remain more-or-less the same number in line with the belief that the principles should not 
be weighed down by too many prescriptions. 84 The Combined Code shall be reviewed 
regularly to ensure it addresses the problems of the times, its most recent revision that 
heralded some minor changes was carried out in 2008.85 
As can be gleaned from the discussion above, the UK made incremental adjustments to 
its codes of corporate governance while taking into account the emerging issues that 
needed to be addressed and the environment in which they were operating within. It is in 
this vein that the setting of various committees has occuned to look into the problematic 
areas and suggest solutions. These solutions were tailored to the needs of the market as it 
then stood. 
2.8. The Development of Corporate Governance in Kenya 
This section will illustrate the direct transplantation of English Laws in Kenya, as it was 
a British colony. It will also aim to discuss, in efforts to synthesis the limits of the law, 
the Kenyan banking sector. The structure and approach of corporate governance in Kenya 
has largely been influenced by the United Kingdom (UK) mainly due its past as a former 
British colony. The fom1al adoption of corporate governance in Kenya has thus minored 
the situation in the UK. Since independence, the changes in the banking sector largely 
mirror the country's political and economic transformation from a colony to an 
independent nation.86 To understand clearly the direct transplantation of British laws we 
need to look at the colonial origins first. 
84 http ://web .msu.ac.zw/e learning/materialll455219768Summary%20of1Yo20Codes.pdf 273, on 29 August 
2018. 
85 http ://web .msu.ac .zw/elearnindmaterial/1455219768Summary%20of1Yo20Codes.pdf 273 , on 29 August 
2018. 
86 S Johnson and Upadhaya R, 'Transformation of Kenya's Banking Sector 2000-2012' in Heyer and M 
Kings, Kenya's Financial Transformation in the 21 51 Century, Financial Sector Deepening Kenya, Nairobi, 
2015, 17. 
23 
The origins of commercial banking in Kenya lie within the start of the colonial period 
when Kenya became a British Protectorate in 1895,87 after which the first two British 
banks were established; the National Bank of India in 1896 and the Standard Bank of 
South Africa in 1910. Commercial banking went on to be relatively well established in 
the colonial period, although it should be noted that banks showed little interest in the 
indigenous African population. 88 
It was not until the 1950's that other banks began to be established in Kenya. It is also 
important to note that there was no central bank but in its stead was the East African 
CuJTency Board, which had very limited functions. 89 These banks, most of them foreign 
owned, are documented as extremely conservative in lending out credit as well as 
establishing a reputation as 'safe banks' yo Tn 1963, at independence, there were nine 
banks operating in Kenya and in 1966, the CBK was established to regulate banks. 91 
Primary evidence of the direct transplantation of British laws can be seen in the 
Companies Act (Chapter 486, Laws of Kenya) which was adopted in almost its entirety 
from England's Companies Act (1948) upon attainment of independence. 92 Directors' 
duties in Kenya at independence were also governed by common law principles. 
Post-independence, in the 1960's Kenya experienced massive economic growth and the 
government felt that the banks were adjusting too slowly and therefore established two 
new banks-Cooperative Bank of Kenya and National Bank of Kenya in 1968.93 The 
1970s saw the growth of African owned banks and financial institutions including one 
local private bank and nine local Non-Bank Financial Inte1mediaries (NBFI's).94 These 
financial institutions were mostly free from regulatory controls. 95 In the 1980's the 
87 S Johnson eta!, 'Transformation of Kenya's Banking Sector 2000-2012', 19. 
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number of NBFI' s would grow from twenty in 1980 to fifty three in 1990 while banks 
grew from seventeen to twenty four. 96 
This rapid growth has been attributed to political factors such as interference by prominent 
politicians in the award of licenses and securing of public sector deposits as well as 
regulatory factors such as very low regulatory baniers. 97 All these contributed to the 
weakening of the banking systems leading to a number of collapses. The poor regulation 
led to the inevitable fall of 12 banks between 1984 and 1989 and by 1998 six more banks 
had fallen, while 1993 alone saw the fall of 15 NBFI' s. 98 
There are a number of lessons that may be drawn from the failures of banks that in the 
1980's, maladies that seem to have crossed over to the 21 51 Century in the fonn of the 
failures of Chase Bank, Imperial Bank and Dubai Bank. The common thread we see is 
that directors have since time immemorial treated banks and financial institutions as their 
personal hedge funds with little to no regard for sound governance principles or 
shareholder interests. This trend has been reinforced by the fact that the penalties for these 
actions amount to a slap on the wrist for the guilty parties. There lacks a corporate 
governance ethic that mandates directors to place stakeholder interests above their own 
which has led to the abuse of directors' powers to the detriment of depositors . We will see 
this culture perpetuated in the collapse of Chase Bank, Imperial Bank and Dubai Bank. 
2.9. The Law Governing Corporate Governance in Kenya 
A system of governance that is based on principles will need to be imbued with two key 
characteristics if it is to be effective: a robust legislative framework or alternatively ethical 
players. It has been observed that in adopting the UK corporate governance scheme, as it 
is to our own landscape, without alteration is akin to uprooting an oak tree from British 
soil and transplanting it on our own. The following section will attempt to explore the 
laws currently governing corporate governance in the country with emphasis on those 
patticularly concerned with the financial sector. As Musik:ali rightly observed, a strong 
96 S Johnson et al, 'Transformation of Kenya's Banking Sector 2000-2012',24. 
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legal framework is a necessity in guarding against self-advancing ploys of those mandated 
to 1un our institutions.99 
On the face of it, Kenya seems primed to perfectly execute a stable corporate governance 
regime. It has a code of corporate govemance in the form of the Code of Corporate 
Govemance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public 20 15 and a regulatory body 
in the form of the CMA. Kenya, it seems, parallels more developed countries in its 
corporate govemance framework. It is against this backdrop that we must ask why then 
our institutions are prone to poor corporate governance. Musikali opines that this is a 
direct result of min·oring the codes while not reinforcing them through the promulgation 
of appropriate legislation. 100 
There are various laws governing corporate govemance in Kenya, these include the 
Constitution of Kenya, the Companies Act, the Capital Markets Act, the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange Rules, the Banking Act, the Prudential Guidelines and the Penal 
Code most of which will feature in our discussion on corporate govemance in Kenya. It 
is important in order to understand the succeeding section on the analysis of the collapse 
of Chase Bank, Imperial Bank and Bank of Dubai to grasp the laws that were in place at 
the material time. This will be followed by a short analysis of the laws as they have been 
amended in light of recent scandals and whether this piece meal approach will be 
sufficient to address the issues of concern. 
The Companies Act (Chapter 486, Laws of Kenya) can perhaps be cited as a catalyst in 
the collapse of the three banks in quick succession. It was adopted from the UK after 
Kenya gained independence.101 As can be deduced from the analysis of the history of the 
corporate governance regime in the UK, it is clear that it was premised on tlu·ee key ideals: 
self-regulation, director's duties and accounting considerations. This is the same basis 
reflected in the common law of companies. In the case of directors, it focuses on the duty 
of care and skill and the duty ofloyalty. The duty of care and skill is the courts attempt to 
ensure that the know-how that the directors have is dedicated to realizing the company' s 
99 Musikali M, 'The law affecting corporate governance in Kenya: A need for review' , I . 
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objectives as opposed to advancing the directors' own enterprises.102 The duty ofloyalty 
requires of the directors' that they act in good faith, that is to say that they keep in mind 
the benefits to their companies and not their collateral advantage. Another aspect of the 
duty of loyalty encompasses the avoidance of conflict of interest, this translates to a caveat 
that the director not have a personal interest in the business or transactions that the 
company is a part of. 103 The execution of these considerations is fim1ly grounded in the 
existence of robust laws, where these are weak, it is extremely difficult for them to be 
effective. 
The now-repealed Companies Act aimed at providing the guide that would engender 
adherence to these principles, however, as circumstances would show, the intended result 
was not the ultimate outcome. There are certain sections worth highlighting that created 
a window through which fraud and the mismanagement of companies were perpetuated. 
One such provision was Section 188 of the repealed Companies Act. This section 
provided a window for bankrupt persons to act as directors of companies as long as they 
obtained leave of the court. 104 Just on the face of this we can see the loophole that would 
allow someone who has been declared bankrupt to take advantage of the law to access 
credit by setting up a limited liability company. It was this same window in the law that 
allowed the execution of the Goldenberg Scandal and the Anglo-leasing scandal in which 
compames were set and used to appropriate funds under the guise of dealing with 
govemment. 105 
Section 189 of the now-repealed Companies' Act also created room for mischief. The 
section as then worded provided that directors who had been found guilty of fraudulent 
trading would be barred from being appointed as directors for a period not exceeding five 
years .106 What this translates to is essentially a cooling off period for those who have been 
involved in fraud as they could take up other positions as directors once they had served 
their comi-dictated time. It is this legislative benevolence that enabled directors who had 
been prime movers in the pilfering of companies to continue to serve as directors in other 
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companies. This was the script that played out for the individuals who can be credited 
with the insolvency of companies such as Kenya National Assurance Company (KNAC) 
and Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC); persons who were 
prosecuted went on to take up directorships in other companies. 107 
One further illustration in the Companies Act as it existed at the time can be found in 
Section 402(1) of the repealed Act that provided that where an officer was culpable for 
breach of trust or negligence, he could be held liable or excused if it was shown that he 
acted honestly and reasonably. 108 This position is reinforced in Flagship Carriers Ltd v 
Imperial Bank where the court held that directors are only required to show a degree of 
skill and knowledge as it can be reasonably expected from a person with similar 
knowledge and skill. This effectively meant that directors had a shield from etTors of 
judgement that they made in business transactions but more than that it gave wide latitude 
for such etTors to be made and condoned without sufficient disincentive to militate against 
undesirable conduct. 
It is my view that these ineffective provisions of the Act played a major role in providing 
fetiile ground for the collapse of the 33 banks in the 80's and as well as the recent failures 
of Chase Bank, Imperial Bank and the Bank of Dubai. The Penal Code could be viewed 
as a further catalyst in not having appropriate or decisive provisions for dealing with 
corporate govemance breaches. Section 329 of the Code provides for the penalty of 
imprisonment for a period of seven years for directors who knowingly give false 
statements with the intention to defraud or deceive the corporation. 109 However, in the 
tandem with the preceding highlighted legislation, there is a loophole that emasculates 
this provision in its current form: this is infmmed by the fact that the institutional rights 
belong to the company and not to its members, hence only the corporate entity can seek 
redress .110 Thus, minority shareholders were unable to institute a suit for a wrongful action 
by the company tmless it is commenced by an aggrieved individual. 111 The Penal Code, 
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to the extent that its provisions do not provide a deterrent on the directors to comply, fails 
as an effective enforcement mechanism. 
2.10. Subsequent Review of the Laws 
With the need to review the legislation pertaining to corporate governance necessitated 
by the collapse of a significant number of institutions, with specific emphasis on banks, 
laws have evolved over the years in an attempt to cure the inherent shortcomings. The 
most recent of these gave impetus to the current Companies Act of2015. However, even 
before this, there were incremental changes made to the Act over the years as necessitated 
by the ever-changing circumstances. 
The Capital Markets Act is one of the key legislations dealing with the corporate 
governance regime in Kenya and provides for the creation of the CMA. 112 The CMA is 
meant to ensure that there exists a conducive environment for long-term investment via 
the regulation and supervision of the securities market. This is done inter alia by the 
imposition of penalties for breach of directives given. A case in point is the fine of Ksh. 
7,000,000 meted out on Fa ida Investment Bank for overdrawing clients' accounts coupled 
with failure to render accurate accounts. Centum Investment was fined Ksh 50,000 for 
failing to issue a profit warning when its earnings fell by over 25%. 113 
In recent times, the CMA has signalled its intent at addressing corporate malfeasance by 
initiating enforcement actions against high profile individuals including the KenolKobil 
CEO, David Ohana, stock market trader Aly-Khan Sachu and Kestrel Capital executive 
director Andre DeSimone for insider trading. 114 
The CMA has facilitated the release of the Code of Corporate Govemance Practices for 
Issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 (Code 20 15) replacing the Codes of Corporate 
Govemance Practices for Public Listed Companies 2002 (Code 2002). The amendment 
of the code was in an effort to move away from simply suggesting compliance to 
enforcement. This is in contrast to the 2002 Code that allowed greater flexibility in a bid 
112 Section 5, Capital Markets Act (Cap 485A). 
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to provide room for companies to self-regulate. The 2015 code tightens the reigns and 
now requires companies to declare non-compliance as well as indicating remedial steps 
towards compliance. Minimum standards of compliance that all listed companies are 
expected to meet are also set out. 115 
The 2015 Code addresses various issues of corporate govemance including provisions 
pertaining to the board of director's, shareholder rights and the accounting function of 
companies. 116 The board of directors is considered the nucleus of the company and the 
various facets of it are addressed under Chapter 2 of the Code. The Code requires that the 
appointment of candidates to the board of directors be transparent. One of the conditions 
through which this is guaranteed is the requirement that such candidates declare a conflict 
of interest. In addition to this, the Code further requires that the board comprise of both 
executive and non-executive directors with an emphasis on the diversity needed to 
effectively oversight the company. The 2015 Code also encourages the separation of the 
role of the Chairman and the CEO by stating that the chaim1an ought to be a non-executive 
director and not the CEO. Lastly, it is important to highlight that Code requires that an 
annual audit be can·ied out by a professional accredited by ICPAK and the results made 
public to engender accountability and transparency. 
The Code goes further by delineating the rights of shareholders and stakeholders under 
Chapter Three. 117 The shareholders are provided with the right to infom1ation, the right to 
vote and the right to participation as some of the core rights. In the same spirit, it is 
recommended that the shareholders be treated equitably. Stakeholders on the other hand 
are provided for under Section Four with the provision that the board of directors should 
mould their management on a stakeholder approach, but this is only to the extent that the 
company' s interests take precedence. 11 8 
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The Companies Act, (20 15) is one of the key legislative documents that pertain to 
corporate governance. Some of the ills we identified in the preceding section sought to be 
cured by the enactment of this Act. The Act replaced the Companies Act (Chapter 486, 
Laws of Kenya) and borrows heavily from the Companies Act 2006 of the United 
Kingdom but modified to suit the Kenyan market. One of the key ways in which the Act 
differs from the repealed Act is the codification of directors' duties. The new Act now 
makes it possible for directors to be held personally liable for breach of their duties . It 
also includes a provision for the disqualification of a director to act in that capacity if they 
are convicted of an offence or found unfit to act. 119 
The Act additionally attempts to give more power to shareholders. It does this by affording 
them a better opportunity to participate in decision-making. They can now approve fixed-
tern1 contracts for directors as well as approve certain transactions. 120 The act further tries 
to align itself with the principles of the rule of law by requiring that director's act within 
their powers as directors while serving the best interests of the company. As a way to 
reinforce this, the directors are required to divorce themselves from any conflicts of 
interests as well as refrain from accepting gifts from third parties. 121 The rationale for this 
is to reduce chances of the directors' loyalty to the company being compromised. The 
Act, though it has attempted to make significant strides in correcting previous ills is not 
without its own set of limitations. 
The Act in so far as it makes strides in codifying the duties of directors fails in the sense 
that the duties set out are somewhat vague. One such illustration is the requirement that a 
director declare any conflict of interest. However, the Act provides an exception to this 
mle in that the other directors can authorise the director concerned to act as such 
regardless of the conflict. Further, the Act provides that it is not necessary for the director 
to declare an interest if the other directors are already aware of it. This has the potential 
119 Mukoma J, 'A comprehensive review of the corporate governance legislative framework encompassed 
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to leave the door open for the directors to exploit the shareholders' interests. 122 In the 
same breath, the act fails to place a timeline within which the conflict of interest should 
be declared. Further to this, there is no attendant liability on the directors in making untrue 
statements or reckless declarations. Consequently, if such statements are relied upon to 
the detriment of the shareholders, it would not be possible to hold the directors liable. 123 
It is also not required under the Act for a director who has declared an interest that results 
in profit for the gains to be accounted to the company which makes it possible for directors 
to benefit from transactions outside the knowledge of the company. 
Some of its other shortcomings include the fact that the Act while recognising the need to 
ensure high accounting standards fails to streamline the accounting standards of 
companies. 124 A move of this kind would make fraud a lot easier to detect. It would also 
make it easier for shareholders to detem1ine if the company directors were discharging 
their duties effectively. The Act also requires that companies lodge a directors' 
remuneration report every financial year with penalties levied for the failure to do so. 125 
This provision fails to designate the contents of the report or whether it wil1 be subject to 
audit. 126 The Act also does not require the companies to have in place a policy dealing 
with directors' remuneration. This leaves room for abuse. It is these loopholes that 
contribute to the reduced efficiency of the corporate governance framework and that this 
study is attempting to highlight and address. 
We must acknowledge the fact that there has been an attempt to address vanous 
shortcomings in the Act. Attempts have been made to deal with some of the anomalies 
that are evident. These include the Companies Amendment Act (20 17) and the Companies 
(General) Amendment Regulations (2017). The Companies Amendment Act (2017) 
addressed the question of conflict of interest and attempts to close the gaps left in the 
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Companies Act, (2015). It bars directors from receiving any gifts from third pa1iies that 
are related or reflective of their role and duties in the company. 127 It fmiher requires 
documentation of the director's family in an effort to hold director's liable for their actions 
if they happen to negatively impact the company. The essential spirit of the amendment 
is greater transparency, it however fails in that it does not address the question of the role 
of executive directors and does not offer guidance on a set standard of financial 
reporting. 128 
The Companies (General) Amendment Regulations (2017) was perhaps envisioned as 
coming to address some of the questions left unanswered by the Companies Amendment 
Act. The Amendment addresses the question of financial reporting. It attempts to offer 
guidelines on the contents of the directors' remuneration report. 129 It further attempts to 
draw a link between director remuneration and company performance. This is an attempt 
to create an incentive for the directors to harbour a stake in the good performance of the 
company.130 However, the Act fails in that it does not require the company to have a policy 
on remuneration, further, it sets the penalty for failure to generate the repoti as a non-
consequential fine not steep enough to engender deterrence. 131 
2.11. The Banking Crisis 
The Kenyan economy went through financial upheaval with the fall of three banks in what 
can be considered quick succession. These were Chase Bank, Dubai Bank and Imperial 
Bank all of which failed around the period between 2014 and 2016. We can attribute some 
of the changes made to the Companies Act and its subsequent amendments to the lessons 
drawn from these bank failures. In an attempt to understand the limitations of the law in 
engendering good corporate governance we shall highlight the circumstances surrounding 
the failure of these banks. 
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2.11.1. The Collapse of Imperial Bank 
The failure of Imperial Bank continues to unravel as more pieces are added to the jigsaw 
puzzle, the latest being the allegation touching on the Deputy Chief Justice Hon. 
Philomena Mwilu. 132 The bank was established back in 1992 as a Finance and Securities 
Company. 133 It was placed under statutory management in October 2015 courtesy of 
unsafe business practices and the presence of unsound business conditions. 134 
The Imperial Bank collapse was reportedly orchestrated by its then-Managing Director, 
who ended up appropriating a total of 38.5 billion shillings from the bank between the 
period of 2002 and 2015. 135 The unravelling of the theft came to light only after his death 
in the fonn of an anonymous series of emails pointing to the fraud that had been 
perpetuated in the bank under his watch. 
How the Managing Director managed to siphon 38.5 billion shillings came down to three 
things: a blatant disregard for the principles of corporate govemance; a concentration of 
power at the top of the executive pyramid; and lastly, an ability to pull almost everyone 
involved into the scheme subtly so as to spread liability. This goes a long way in 
reinforcing the view that to appeal to the morality of the people is not in fact sufficient 
deterrence. One of the means that he used to advance the fraud was through handwritten 
notes for funds to be moved from one account to another with neither explanation nor 
justification. 136 The smoking gun however lay with an account registered as WE Tilley, a 
fish processing company which had received, by the time the scandal came to light, Kshs. 
34,000,000,000. 137 
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In order not to be caught, it was necessary for the Managing Director to make sure the 
books balanced. For this purpose, he colluded with James Kaburu who was the CFO at 
the time to tweak the accounts appropriately. 138 Later, the Managing Director discovered 
a software that was able to make the accounts look right to the outside world and 
successfully conceal the money he was siphoning out of the bank. Ultimately, the theft of 
Imperial Bank is another illustration of the consequences of slack corporate governance 
requirements. The CEO consolidated his power and ran the bank as a personal fiefdom. 
He mandated the movement of money without entertaining questions, he facilitated 
unregulated lending to companies and finally, he signed off on unsecured loans for people 
in positions of power as a way of winning favours notwithstanding the exposure of and 
risk of customer deposits. 139 
2.11.2. The Failure ofDubai Bank 
Dubai Bank has a long history in the country stretching back to the year 1982 when it was 
established. As of the December 2013, the Bank's assets stood at Ksh 2.92 billion, it was 
therefore extremely shocking when barely two years later in August of 2015, the bank 
was placed under receivership. 140 The reasons for this as put forth by CBK were the 
deteriorating cash reserve ratio position as well as a failure to honour certain financial 
obligations such as paying off Ksh. 48 million which it owed to the Barile of Africa 
Kenya.141 
The fate of Dubai Bank was sealed by three major circumstances. First, the bank had only 
three directors on its board when the minimum required was five. The Bank also had a 
loan portfolio that stood at 4.1 billion, added to this was the fact that it was insolvent to 
the tune of 1.3 billion.142 The Bank was also unable to honour customer instructions to 
complete transactions totalling Sh41 million. 
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Dubai Bank found itself in this precarious position in much the same way other banks 
have: The former Managing Director Nereah Said, who was fired in 2012, touching on 
irregular transactions that exposed close to Ksh 2 billion in customer deposits. Nereah 
went further to point out the principal shareholder, Hassan Zubeidi for putting the bank in 
the position it had found itself in. 143 She stated that Zubeidi was in the habit of offering 
unsecured loans to friends and in so doing, placed depositor's funds in jeopardy. 
Ultimately, the bank was declared unsalvageable and went into liquidation-which may 
be linked directly to a failme in the corporate governance structure to regulate its 
activities. 
2.11.3. Thefailure ofChase Bank 
Chase Bank opened its doors in 1996. It was the product of the rebranding of the United 
Bank ofKenya which had been placed under receivership in 1995. 144 The Bank seemed 
to operate smoothly in the more than one decade in which it served depositors and was 
even honoured as 'Best Company to Work for in Kenya' by Deloitte. However, the bank 
came tumbling down on April20 16 when CBK placed it under receivership. 145 The action 
was informed by the banks failure to meet the statutory banking ratios as well as under 
reporting of insider loans. 
The collapse of Chase Bank was an eventuality waiting to happen. The Chaim1an Mr. 
Zaffrullah Khan was the main culprit. Mr. Khan ranks as the largest beneficiary in the 
looting that brought the bank to its knees through the plunder of Ksh. 11 billion which 
was systematically siphoned from the bank. 146 Khan managed to orchestrate this through 
the help of managing director, Duncan Kabui . The two siphoned cash to entities they co-
owned.147 Khan also used some of the money to buy real estate and invest in construction 
companies in Nairobi and abroad which caused the large outflows that Chase Bank 
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registered in 2012. 148 In order to re-open Chase Bank, CBK seized assets that amounted 
to 7.9 billion from the pair. 149 Among the assets were a business park in Karen, a three-
acre parking lot in Nairobi, some 240 acres of land on Mombasa Road, a three-acre plot 
next to the Gennan Embassy on Riverside Drive and various high-end properties in Dubai . 
The question that begs then, is how were the two able to loot so much money? The answer 
lies in Musharakah, a sharia compliant financial product used by Islamic Banks, which 
was used to camouflage irregular insider borrowing. 150 The directors awarded themselves 
15-year interest free loans under the guise ofMusharakah. 151 Legally, the CBK Prudential 
Guidelines allow banks to lend internally to staff and directors up to a maximum of 25 
percent of core capital. Mr. Khan, in flagrant disregard of this provision, lent himself 7.9 
billion, which was largely unsecured. 152 Ultimately, the bank advanced 16.6 billon 
irregularly to various entities, many of which were associated with insiders. 153 
Eventually, the failure of Chase Bank came down to poor corporate govemance practices. 
This can be seen in the fact that it was difficult to demarcate the properties owned by 
Chase Bank and those owned by Mr. Khan. Secondly, the rampant unregulated insider 
lending is another indication that the corporate governance practices were overlooked or 
lax at best. This can be explained by the fact that most of these loans were non-perfonning 
as a large number were unsecured and unlikely to be paid back at al1. 154 
148 https ://www.busincssdailyafrica.com/corporate/Oustcd-Chase-Bank-chairman-was-architcct-of-
Shll bn-loot/5 39550-3191404-h8dxub/indcx.html on 5 September 2018 . 
149 https:!/www.busincssdailyafr.ica.com/corporate/Ousted-Chase-Bank-chairman-was-a rchitect-of-
Shl l bn-loot/539550-3191404-h8dxub/index.html on 5 September 2018. 
150 https: //www.nation.eo.ke/business/CBK-seizes-Sh8bn-from-Chase-Bank-directors/996-31815 14-
oio54hz/index.html on 5 September 2018. 
151 https :/ /www.nation.eo.ke/business/CBK -seizes-Sh8bn-from-Chase-Bank -di rectors/996-3181514-
oio54hz/index.html on 5 September 2018. 
152 https://www.nation.eo.ke/news/Rogue-bank-goes-clown-with-Sh96b/1 056-3 1 50706-
q2kfehz/index.html on 5 September 2018. 
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2.12. Conclusion 
The tl.ndings of this chapter show the inextricable link between corporate governance 
failure and bank failure. The corporate governance structures have proven insufficient by 
allowing directors to make away with millions. The Jesson to be drawn from the flagrant 
abuse of the confidence of depositors in the above banks is that fraud is omnipresent. As 
much as we would like to leverage the essential goodness in human nature, we ought to 
concede that perhaps principle-based approach while idealistic is not realistic. What we 
should draw from the above is the need to employ stronger enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure compliance to the code of corporate govemance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Corporate Governance 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out to discuss the various theories underpinning the development of 
corporate governance and the areas it impacts. An analysis of the theories on corporate 
governance lays a base for understanding the issue in greater depth. An important caveat 
issued by Christine Mallin is that due to corporate governance being a global phenomenon 
it brings about legal, cultural and structural differences thus some theories may be more 
relevant and appropriate to one country than they are to another. 155 
The theories that affect corporate governance are quite varied and include; Agency, 
transaction cost economics, stakeholder, stewardship, class hegemony, managerial 
hegemony, path dependence, resource dependence, institutional, political and network 
governance. We hope to undertake an analysis ofthe main theories herein. 
3.2. The Agency Dilemma 
The agency dilemma is also known as the agency problem or the principal agent problem. 
The 'principal-agent' problem was first referenced by Ross to refer to the general problem 
of devising a contract to ensure the agent pursues the principal's goals as efficiently as 
possible. 156 Ross continues to state that there are two sources to the principal-agent 
problem; imperfect information and misalignment of goals between agent and principal. 
For Eisenhardt, agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur 
in agency relationships; 1) conflicting desires between the principal and the agent and 2) 
the difficulty and the high costs involved when the principal tries to verify what the agent 
is doing. 157 
155 Malin C, C01porate Governance, Oxford University Press, 5 ed, Oxford, 2016, 16. 
156 Ross S 'The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem' 53(2) American Economic Review, 
134-39. 
157 Eisenhardt K, 'Agency Theory: An assessment and Review', 58 . 
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Eisenhardt and Ross were not alone in identifying the problems with the agency relation. 
As early as the 18111 Century, Smith pointed out that the directors of corporations being 
managers of other people's money rather than their own, cannot be expected to watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance as if it were their own.158 
This problem can be expressed as self- interest or opportunism on the part of the agent. 159 
In an agency relationship the principal expects the agent to act and make decisions in the 
best interests of the shareholder. However this may not always be the case and there are 
a number of dimensions to this; the agent may not act in the interest of the principal at all, 
he may act just partially in the interest of the principal, there may also be infonnation 
asymmetry where the agent has access to more infom1ation and thus putting the principal 
at a disadvantage.160 The position that agents will always act in their self-interest is one 
put forward by those who, using the economic model of rationality, assume that rational 
individuals are self-interested and act only from egoistic or altruistic motives. 16 1 
The standard response to the position is that the economic model of rationality suggests 
no such thing. The model assumes that the individuals always make prudent and logical 
decisions that provide them with the highest amount of personal utility and this happens 
to reflect the desires that they may have be they egoistic or altruistic. 162 Therefore, agency 
theory is how individuals manage situations involving goal incongruity between two or 
more persons notwithstanding that the goals may be selfish or not and that the goals of 
the other only show up in so far as they affect the goals of the agent thus business ethicists 
have concluded that agency theory is perfectly hannless .163 
The second problem highlighted by Eisenhardt is that of agency costs. Agency costs 
include the costs of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts among agents 
with conflicting interests. Agency costs also include the value of output lost because the 
158 Malin C, Corporate Governance, 19. 
159 Malin C, Corporate Governance, 17. 
160 Malin C, Corporate Governance, 17. 
161 Heath J, 'The Uses and Abuses of Agency theory' 19 Business Ethics Quarterly 4, 2009, 503 
162 Heath J, ' The Uses and Abuses of Agency theory', 500. 
163 Heath J, 'The Uses and Abuses of Agency theory' , 500. 
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costs of full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits. 164 This is better understood if 
we view our concept of an organisation as a nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, 
among owners, factors of production and customers. 165 The said contracts specify the 
rights of each agent in the organisation and the perfom1ance criteria for evaluating agents. 
3.3. Agency Theory 
Agency theory is at the forefront of the development of corporate govemance as well as 
providing the theoretical framework in which corporate govemance finds a natural 
habitat. 166 Agency theory having roots in economic theory can be defined as the 
relationship between the principals, such as shareholders, and agents such as the company 
executives and managers. 167 Its sheer simplicity in reducing the management of a 
corporation to just two levels (managers and shareholders) has been deemed a major factor 
in its prominence. 168 
Agency theory identifies the agency relationship where one party (the principal) delegates 
work to another party (the agent) and in the context of a corporation the owners 
(shareholders) are the principals while the agents are the directors. 169 Corporations quoted 
on the stock exchange (whether the NSE or the London Stock Exchange) are often large 
and require substantial investment in equity to fund them thus inevitably they would have 
a large number of investors in the form of shareholders. Shareholders therefore delegate 
control to what they consider professional managers who take the form of a board of 
directors. The agency theory in the context of corporations is set in the context of 
separation of ownership and control. The owners are the shareholders while the directors 
of the corporations control the corporation. 170 
164 Fama E and Jensen M, 'Separation of Ownership and Control' 26(2) The Journal of Law and Economics, 
1983, 304. 
165 Fama E and Jensen M, 'Separation of Ownership and Control', 302. 
166 Malin C, Co1porate Governance, 24. 
167 Abdullah H and Valentine B, 'Fundamental Ethics and Theories of Corporate Governance' Middle 
Eastern Finance and Economics, 2009, 89. 
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According to Eisenhardt, the key idea in agency theory is that principal agent relationships 
should reflect the efficient organisation of information and risk bearing costs. 171 The 
assumptions of this theory can be categorised into human and organisational. The human 
ones being self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion while the organisational 
category contains; infonnation asymmetry between principal and agent, efficiency as the 
effectiveness criterion and lastly partial goal conflict among participants. 172 
To understand the various positions put forward, it is important to note that most of agency 
theory as related to corporations is set in the context of separation of ownership and 
control. With investors or shareholders being the owners and directors taking control. The 
development of this relationship has been credited for the industrialisation of countries 
and separation ofmarkets. 173 The United Kingdom and the United States of America have 
been praised for their legal systems that fostered strong and good protection for minority 
shareholders resulting in a more diversified shareholder base. 174 
Unfortunately, the same protections cannot be said to have been provided to many 
minority shareholders especially in the many countries that use a civil law system.175 This 
can be attributed to the rigidity of a civil law system that does not do so well in adapting 
to the ever-changing corporate landscape. 176 The weaker protection of rights does not do 
well to attract investors. Rather, it keeps them away. 
The problem of self-interest as discussed earlier can be seen to manifest itself quite well 
in this discussion of separation of ownership and control. A tendency among corporations 
has been to dilute controlling blocks of shares leading to ownership without power. 177 
These powerless owners have had to watch on as directors overpay themselves, scandals 
unfold and collapses occur. Ultimately, these shareholders have witnessed the loss of their 
investments. 
171 Eisenhardt K, 'Agency Theory: An assessment and Review' 14 The Academy of Management Review 1, 
1989,59. 
172 Eisenhardt K, 'Agency Theory: An assessment and Review', 59. 
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Flowing from this, we can say that the calls for shareholders to reclaim their power and 
act as owners not just holders of shares have been justified if not necessary. If they do 
this, then they will be able to exercise more direct control over boards hence fostering 
accountability and improved transparency as embodied in corporate governance codes. 178 
The board of directors is a particularly essential monitoring device to try and ensure that 
any problems that may be brought about by the principal agent relationship are minimised. 
Blair in Malin put it succinctly, 'Managers are supposed to be the agents of a corporations 
'owners' but managers must be monitored and institutional arrangements must provide 
some checks and balances to make sure they do not abuse their power.' 179 The institutional 
arrangement providing the said checks and balances is the board of directors. It is vital 
that the board and the board chair are independent of the CEO and that incentives are used 
to bind CEO interests to those of shareholders. 180 
Agency theory is particularly important in this paper as it is regarded by many as an 
essential tool for analysing and understanding the spate of corporate ethics scandals. 181 
Others have taken the completely opposite stance, as is so often with these matters, and 
gone as far as saying that these scandals would not have occurred had it not been for the 
widespread teaching of the agency theory in the majority of business schools. 182 
With firms in the banking sector, a focus of this paper, a similar set of agency conflicts 
arises owing to the interaction of three sets of interest groups; managers, shareholders and 
creditors. As earlier intimated, shareholders often have conflicts with managers because 
managers seek quick profits that increase their own wealth, power, reputation and 
rewards, (what we have termed as the problem of self-interest) while shareholders are 
more interested in a slow and steady growth over time. Since banks operate under different 
178 Malin C, Corporate Governance, 18. 
179 Malin C, Corporate Governance, 17. 
180 Malin C, Corporate Governance, 21. 
181 Heath J, 'The Uses and Abuses of Agency theory', 03 . 
182 Heath J, 'The Uses and Abuses of Agency theory', 503 . 
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statutes, the transaction and borrowing costs increase due to information asymmetry; 
increased monitoring and limiting managers' powers. 183 
To surmise this paper's discussions of agency theory, according to agency theorists, the 
purpose of studying the agency theory is to identify points of conflict among the key 
players and suggest the following mechanisms of corporate governance to reduce it: 
1. No duality, that is, one person should not hold the position of CEO and Chairman 
of the Board. This avoids managerial opportunism and agency loss. 
2. Provision of financial incentives to managers: including fixing executive 
compensation and levels ofbenefits linked to shareholders' returns . 
3. Introduction and inclusion of more independent directors on the board. 
4. Direct intervention by shareholders and the threat of firing the underperforming 
managers (shareholder activism). 
5. An active market for corporate control: The threat of a hostile takeover disciplines 
managerial behavior and induces managers to focus on maximizing shareholder 
value. 
3.4. Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship Theory has its roots in psychology and sociology and was first properly 
defined by Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson. Their definition being, 'a steward protects 
and maximizes shareholders wealth through firm performance because by so doing, the 
stewards' utility functions are maximized.' 184 Stewardship Theory stresses not on the 
perspective of individualism, but rather on the role of top management being as stewards, 
integrating their goals as part of the organization. The stewardship perspective suggests 
that stewards are satisfied and motivated when organizational success is attained. 185 
183 Hughes J and Mester L, 'Efficiency in Banking: Theory, Practice and Evidence ' Oxford Handbook of 
Banking, 2008, 4. 
184 Abdullah Hand Valentine B, 'Fundamental Ethics and Theories of Corporate Governance ', 90. 
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The theory recognizes the importance of structures that are geared and built towards 
maximum autonomy and trust in an effort to empower the steward. 
Stewardship theory is discussed after agency theory because it draws on the assumptions 
underlying it. It is also closely related to agency theory in that those who were wary of it 
introduced it as an alternative to agency. 186 While agency calls for protection of 
shareholders' interests by separation of incumbency of roles of board and chair, 
stewardship theory argues that shareholders' interests are maximized by shared 
incumbency of these roles. 187 This is because stewardship theory aims at creating a 
situation where power and authority are concentrated in one person. Stewardship theory 
intends for the CEO's power to be unambiguous and unchallenged with no room for doubt 
over who has authority over a particular matter. 188 Thus the corporation gets to enjoy the 
benefits of unity of direction of strong command and control. 189 
Donaldson and Davis conducted research on the entire debate on whether the CEO and 
the Chair of the board should be separate people. In their research they term it as duality 
if one person holds the CEO position and is also the chair of the board. Their research 
had four hypotheses that it was testing. They could be grouped into two categories, 
hypotheses yielded by agency theory and those yielded by stewardship theory. 
Interestingly enough, the two sets of hypotheses were diametrically opposed. 
The hypotheses yielded by agency theory are; 1) CEO duality leads to lower returns to 
shareholders and 2) Any observed positive effects of CEO duality are caused by long-
term compensation and are spurious.190 
186 Malin C, Corporate Governance, 21. 
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The hypotheses yielded by stewardship theory regarding corporate governance; 1) CEO 
duality leads to higher return to shareholders and 2) the positive effects of CEO duality 
are not due to the spurious effects oflong-tenn compensation. 191 
Their research presents empirical evidence that the returns to shareholders are improved 
by combining the roles of the chair and the CEO. 192 Therefore the results fail to support 
the agency theory and lend support to stewardship theory with regard to CEO governance. 
Put succinctly, the stewardship model can be summarized as one where shareholders 
empower and trust stewards who in turn get both intrinsically and extrinsically motivated 
to perform in a way that protects and maximizes shareholders wealth. 193 The executive 
manager, stewardship theory holds, has no problem of executive motivation; he is far from 
what you would describe as opportunistic and essentially wants to be a good steward of 
the corporate assets. 194 Because of the trust in stewardship theory there are minimal to no 
costs involved in monitoring and controlling employees as opposed to the well-
documented agency costs. 195 
Donaldson and Davis, albeit proponents of stewardship theory, argue that due to the mixed 
empirical evidence neither agency theory nor stewardship theory represent a 'golden 
bullet' for corporate governance. 196 There is also empirical evidence from a study of seven 
hundred and sixty eight company directors from the United States of America showing 
that these directors experienced role conflict in having to serve shareholder interests 
whilst at the same time maintain camaraderie within the board. 197 
19 1 Donaldson Land Davis J, 'Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder 
Returns',52. 
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3.5. Stakeholder Theory 
A stakeholder is defined as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation's objectives. 198 A common way of differentiating the 
various categories of stakeholders is to consider the groups that have classifiable 
relationships within the same organisations. 199 They include: customers, suppliers and 
distributors, shareholders and the local community. 
The stakeholder theory is hinged on the fact that, unlike the agency theory where the 
managers 'serve' the stakeholders, the stakeholders in this case all have various 
responsibilities to serve. 200 These various responsibilities include decision-making and 
they are mainly based on a network of relationship amongst the stakeholders. It is taken 
that the stakeholders have various interests in the organisation and that no interest is meant 
to dominate each other/01 hence, the importance of the network of relationship. In 
juxtaposition to the agency theory, it holds and takes into account a wider group rather 
than just the shareholders. 202 
The 21st century has been characterised by drastic changes in business, which include 
globalisation, the growth of information technology and the liberalization of states. One 
of the key changes has been the increased societal awareness of the impact of businesses 
on communities and nations.203 This inherently introduces the public trust doctrine in 
business. Most business crises illustrate two points. The first is that they both evidently 
depict that managerial actions affect a broad range of people. 204 Second, that the pursuit 
of corporate objectives can be easily disrupted by the actions of unexpected groups or 
individuals. 205 The stakeholder theory was therefore developed to conceptualize and solve 
such problems. 
198 Fonataine C, Haarman A and Schmid S, The stakeholder theory, 2006, 3. 
199 Fonataine C et al, The stakeholder theory, 6. 
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This theory was proposed and developed by Freeman in 1984. It seeks to address and 
redress three pertinent questions. The first is the problem of value creation and trade. It 
sought to answer the question of how value is created in a constantly and rapidly changing 
business world. The second was the problem of the ethics of capitalism. This is because 
capitalism became the dominant way of determining value and organising trade. 
Therefore, its effects had to be taken into consideration by the decision makers rather than 
its effects being determined and felt by society.206 The third is the problem of restructuring 
the managerial mind-set. With the dynamic business world, decision makers need to 
remain relevant and make informed decisions about the businesses in question. Freeman 
suggests, through the stakeholder theory that a relationship between these decision makers 
would better manage and deal with these problems that it ought to address. 207 The general 
idea of the stakeholder theory is therefore a re-definition of organisation. 208 
Freeman recognised that the traditional strategy approach bore no fruit especially in times 
of economic turbulence. He saw the need for a restructuring of the organisational models 
in firms. He therefore decided to choose the word 'stakeholder' on the basis of the 
traditional terrri stockholder which only took a look at the economic point of view of 
business while the tem1 stakeholder could be adapted to mean any group that can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives. 209 
It is more of a practical theory because all firms, in this case banks, have to manage the 
stakeholders to yield positive results. Stakeholders that are treated and managed well 
reciprocate positively towards the organisation by sharing valuable infonnation, buying 
more products and services, providing better financial terms and providing tax breaks or 
other incentives.210 This decision-making process does not exist in a utopian world. What 
this means is that, unlike other business theories that rely on purely separating business 
decisions from ethical decisions, the stakeholder theory integrates the two.211 Thus, the 
206 Freeman E et al, The stakeholder theory: State of the art, .S-6. 
207 Freeman E et al, The stakeholder theory: State of the art, 5-6. 
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genesis of the stakeholder theory is the integration thesis and the responsibility 
principle. 212 
The integration thesis advances the idea that one cannot separate decision-making in 
business and ethics. The idea was articulated by stating that most business decisions have 
some ethical content or an implicit ethical view and vice versa. 213 Secondly, the moment 
we separate ethics from business, we eliminate the responsibility aspect of being held 
accountable for various managerial decisions. This allows people to get away with as 
much at the expense of others, creating a pool of opportunists and a corporate governance 
structure modelled on impunity.214 The stakeholder theory therefore hinges on these two 
principles and strives to achieve a situation of business working effectively and at its best. 
A stakeholder approach emphasizes on the importance of investing in relationships with 
those who have a stake in the firm. If the networks mentioned earlier are managed 
properly, the stability of a firn1 is guaranteed. 215 
So, it does solve the problem of value creation because it can show how businesses can 
be described through these same decision-making relationships. The problem of 
managerial mindsets by putting in place proper structures that define stakeholder 
relationships and intertwine ethics and decision-making in business. 
The stakeholder approach is quite different from the shareholder view. According to 
Williamson, shareholders deserved special consideration over other stakeholders because 
of 'asset specificity'. Which was mainly because he believed that the shareholder's stake 
was tied to the success ofthe firm. 216 Before countering this argument, it is important to 
be cognizant of the fact that many companies strive to maximise shareholder interest. This 
means that the shareholders, excluding the stakeholders are the prime recipients of the 
free cash-flow (profits gained after all the stakeholders and loans have been paid).217 This 
in tum evidences the fact that the whole society does not gain maximum benefit, as it 
212 Fonataine C, et al, The stakeholder theory, 9. 
213 Freeman E et al, The stakeholder theory: State of the art, 7-8. 
214 Freeman E et al, The stakeholder theory: State of the art, 8. 
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should be. The shareholder approach is based on the Anglo-American model where the 
board executives are purely based on the shareholder's choice. 21 8 However, the 
stakeholder theory is based on the German model where the public and employees have a 
say and a right to elect their representatives to sit alongside with the directors. 21 9 Back to 
Williamson's approach; his argument could be used to also explain stakeholder 
relationship. All stakeholders have an interest and stakes that are specific220 thus fulfilling 
the requirement of 'asset-specificity'. 
To further understand the stakeholder theory, it is important to recognise that business is 
about how customers, suppliers, employees, financiers, communities and managers 
interact.221 They all have some interest in the organisation (the 'asset specificity') . For 
example, employees have their jobs and livelihood at stake, financiers have a financial 
stake (in form ofbonds and so on), customers and suppliers benefit from the products and 
services and the local community grants the firm rights to build facilities and in tum, 
benefits from the tax base and economic contributions.222 No stakeholder's interests are 
considered over the others. Their interests must be connected. Even when interests 
conflict, there has to be a way of rethinking the problem to create a multifaceted interest 
once again. 223 
The purpose of the stakeholder theory was to create methods for different groups to 
achieve strategic management.224 Donaldson and Peterson recognised that the stakeholder 
theory was descriptive, instrumental and nmmative; Descriptive: Aims to understand how 
managers deal with stakeholders and how they represent their interests;225Instrumental: it 
studies the organisational consequences and the connection between the practice of the 
stakeholder management and the achievement of various corporate goals;226Normative: 
2 18 Malin C, Corporate governance, 18. 
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The identification of the moral and philosophical guidelines linked to the activities or the 
management of corporations.227These principles enable and guide actual stakeholders in 
forming a proper organisational finn model. 
However, there is some criticism towards the stakeholder theory. Firstly, some scholars 
claim that it provides an inadequate explanation of the firm's behaviour within its 
environment meaning that it does not sufficiently address the dynamics which link the 
firm to the stakeholders. 228 There has also been an issue towards the Stakeholder Theory 
suggestion that stakeholder groups can be easily identified as separable entities while in 
reality it's more complex than that. 229 The final criticism towards stakeholder theory is 
that it regards the environment as static as it does not address the element of change that 
occurs over time. 230 Despite this, the stakeholder theory is considered to better equip 
managers to foster and articulate the shared purpose of the finn. 
3. 6. Transaction Costs Economic Theory 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, agency theory is the most prominent theory that is 
applied in corporate govemance. However some researchers tend to consider the agency 
theory inconclusive from the perspective of whether it answers the following questions: 
(i) whether ownership concentration is related to better firm performance (ii) whether the 
composition of the board of directors, its size, or the committees in it have any impact on 
the fim1's performance. 231 Conclusively, there have been conflicting opinions on the 
comprehensibility of the agency theory. Different researchers have different conclusions 
and beliefs. 232 Basically, the lack of conclusiveness of the agency theory necessitated a 
shift in the theoretical focus. The agency theory also emphasises the need and importance 
of the separation of ownership and control. This meant that as firms grew in size, they 
automatically required an increase in capital, creating a conflict and general issues 
227 Donaldson T and Preston L, 'The stakeholder theory of corporation: Concepts, evidence and 
implications', 71. 
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surrounding the whole idea of separation and ownership. 233 Thus, leading to the 
adaptation of a new theory, the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).234 
The Transaction Cost Economics theory was first highlighted by Ronald Coase in 193 7 
and has now expanded to become one of the most influential management theories that 
addresses not only the scale of the firm but also its internal workings of corporate 
governance and organisation. 235 It was not until the 1970s/1980s that this theory was 
gradually developed by Oliver Williamson. 
There are two main types oftransaction costs; internal ones and external ones.236 Extemal 
costs include paid costs of getting information in addition to the opportunity cost of the 
time that is taken up in searching.237 It is important to note that when undertaking a 
transaction, parties must incur several costs (transaction costs). For example, if a 
tratisaction is to be governed by a contract, the contract must be drafted, the terms must 
be negotiated. Such costs are ex ante costs. Costs incurred before the transaction takes 
place, while ex post costs are incurred in consummating and safeguarding the deal that 
was originally struck. The basic notion of transaction cost economic theory is that 
transactions tend to be placed in a way that maxirnises the net benefits they provide, 
including the costs of transactions. Therefore, if a transaction's cost outweighs the 
benefits of completion, it will not be undertaken at all. 
The transaction cost approach regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and it 
requires that all transactions in a firm be put in dimensions and that alternative governance 
structures be described. 238 At its foundations, the theory is more concerned with 
organisational efficiency.239 For example, how a complex transaction should be structured 
233 Malin C, Co1porate Governance, 20. 
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and governed so as to minimise waste and also the internalisation of the transaction to 
provide a more efficient approach.240 
Transaction costs refer to the explicit fees that are associated with it and the implicit fees 
of monitoring and controlling a transaction.Z41 The choice of governance stmcture by 
decision makers ought to be holistic and should consider human and environmental 
factors , also known as the dimensions of transaction costs. Human factors include 
bounded rationality which comes fi·om the limited capacity of shareholder and managers 
in a firm to process all the available information and consider every possible outcome 
associated with a transaction.242 Bounded rationality, in simple tenns, means the lack of 
enough infonnation.243 This exposes the parties to some sort of risk such as exploitation. 
Generally, this increases the h·ansaction costs because the company cannot easily make 
the right decisions because they lack adequate information about a given relationship or 
environment. To counter this, the owners or relevant parties must incur some costs in 
gaining such infonnation. 
Another human factor is opp01iunism. Being perceived as a 'self-interest seeking with 
guile' , principals and agents have different goals with their own self-interest being at the 
forefront. 244 A finn must therefore use safeguards as a guarantee when signing contracts 
to be sure that services agreed upon are fulfilled and the supplier will not tend to act in 
his own best interest. 245 
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Environmental factors can be summed up through asset specificity. Asset specificity is 
the most important dimension of describing transactions. It refers to the degree in which 
the investments necessary for a transaction are specific and particular to that 
transaction. 246 It can arise in three ways: 
a. Site specificity. When a series of successive stations are located next to 
each other so as to reduce and economise on transportation and inventory 
expenses.247 
b. Physical asset specificity. This is where specialised machines are meant to 
produce a component. 248 
c. Human asset specificity. These are experience costs. What the individual 
leams by doing. 249 This skill acquisition should be specific to the 
employer. The mere deepening of skills that are not relevant to the finn 
means that the employee is easy to substitute. However, greater valued 
skills need to be embedded and protected in a protective kind of 
govemance structure. 250 
When assets are unspecified towards a buyer, a supplier can easily sell the output to the 
market without any difficulties .251 Buyers can also easily turn to alternative sources. 
Williamson refers to this as idiosyncratic transactions. However, when a buyer convinces 
the supplier to invest in a specific or rather when an investment is made, the buyer and 
seller then start effectively operating in a bilateral relation for a considerable period of 
time.252 The buyer is therefore committed to the transaction and the seller cannot look for 
other altematives. 
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Transactions ultimately have three dimensions: unce1iainty, the frequency of which 
transactions recur and asset specificity. 253 Having discussed asset specificity, we shall 
now take a look at the other two dimensions as components of the TCE theory. 
Unce1iainty refers to the risk associated with a transaction. 254 This can arise from both 
environmental variability and behavioural variability. Environmental uncertainty such as 
technological unce1iainty deals with the difficulty of foreseeing and anticipating changes 
in the relevant environment.255 The problem with contracting is that it is quite difficult as 
well to write complete contracts that envisage these unforeseeable events. In the long run, 
this might be seen as contractual gaps that may necessitate the need for re-negotiation and 
adaptation. Contract re-negotiation and adaptation is a costly process and will most 
definitely increase transaction costs.256 Behavioural uncertainty is based on opportunism 
and also encompasses the difficulty in evaluating the behaviour and performance of a 
transaction partner. It is very difficult to examine who will engage in opportunistic 
behaviour. 
Secondly, frequency refers to the volume of transactions between the two exchange 
patiies. 257 If transactions are not frequent, then the cost of altemative govemance 
stmctures may not be justified. A larger volume transaction gives rise to the justification 
for alternative governance structures. 258 
So how then is the transaction cost economics theory relevant to corporate governance? 
If assets are non-specific, there is no need of having corporate govemance struch1res. This 
is because there are no complex transactions to be canied out. A simple transaction such 
as purchasing milk has little unce1iainty to it, low asset specificity and no risk, therefore 
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it is a straight forward transaction.259 Therefore, the TCE theory goes ahead to explain 
why such simple transactions are organised in a buyer- seller market and provides insight 
on why complex transaction require complex governance structures.260 Governance 
structures can be seen as a way of internalising and making decisions that have not been 
thought out in the initial contract. 261 The TCE approach ensures that governance decisions 
are held accountable at every decision-making level to ensure maximisation of benefit 
and the economisation of costs.262 
Williamson defines a governance structure as an 'institutional framework which the 
integrity of a transaction is carried out or a related set of transactions is decided'. 263 
Governance is therefore based upon the fact that the decisions made should be in view of 
ensuring economic transactions. Therefore, if the cost of using the market is too high, 
other governance structures, such as hierarchical production in a finn , are preferred.264 
3. 7. Resource Dependency Economic Theory 
It derives from economics and sociology disciplines concerned with the distribution of 
power in the firm. This theory views the board of directors as the lynch pin between a 
company and the resources it needs to use as it seeks to fulfil its objectives.265 It focuses 
on the role that directors play in providing and securing essential resources to an 
organiz"ation through its linkages to the external environment. 266 The resources in question 
being brought to the firm include infonnation, skills and access to key constituents such 
as suppliers, buyers, public policy makers, social groups as well as legitimacy267 . 
Generally, there are four categories into which directors may be placed; insiders, business 
experts, support specialists and those who influence the community.268 First, the insiders 
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are usually current and fonner executives of the firm and they give expertise in various 
areas such as finance and law on the firm itself as well as providing general strategy and 
direction.269 Second, the business experts are current, fonner senior executives and 
directors of other large for-profit firms and they provide expertise on business strategy, 
decision-making and problem solving. 270Third, the support specialists are the lawyers, 
bankers, insurance company representatives and public relations experts and they provide 
support in their individual specialized fields. Finally, those who influence the community 
are the political leaders, university faculty, members of clergy, leaders of social or 
community organizations. 271 
3.8. Path Dependence Theory 
The fourth theory under this is path dependence theory. It identifies two sources ofpath 
dependence; structure driven and rule driven.272 It was extensively developed by Mark 
Roe and Lucian Bebchuk, who made the point that corporate structures depend on the 
structures with which the economy started. 273 In their own words, 'initial ownership 
sh·uctures can affect both the identity of the rules that would be efficient and the interest 
group politics that can detennine which rules would actually be chosen. ' 274 Path 
dependence is remarkably commonplace as it is hardly controversial to suggest that initial 
conditions matter, that ideologies and accidents affect the design of institution and that 
past decisions shape ctment choices. If this sounds familiar, it's because historians have 
been telling us the same for some time now. In-fact historians have had their go at 
economists saying, 'path dependent is the tenn economists use because they can't get 
themselves to say the word history. ' 275 
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Some have concluded that path dependency makes institutions matter in only two 
circumstances: when they fit the dominant character and technology of industrial 
production in a given economy and when they act as 'guardrails', continuously 
channelling movements along a well-worn path.276 Others have issued a warning, stating 
that uncritical application of this path dependence theory could obscure the economic 
constraints that influence finn monitoring and decision making in market economies 
worldwide. 277 
The question left is what is the promise of path dependence to corporate governance? A 
path dependence perspective facilitates meaningful systems analysis of competing 
governance by allowing us to see the choices, or the lack thereof, that shape the 
development of institutions. 278 The lens of path dependence enables us to liberate 
corporate governance theories from their focus on static equilibrium responses to specific 
governance problems. 279 
The fifth and penultimate theory falling under this discussion is institutional theory. 
Institutional theory looks at the institutional environment, its influence on societal beliefs 
and practices which impact on various 'actors' within society. 280 Because of its insights 
into the nature of authority and control stmctures, the institutional theory is uniquely 
positioned to provide important contributions to scholarship on corporate governance. 
The sixth and final theory being discussed is network governance. It has been arbrued that 
companies should have a structure of network governance and those in support of this 
argument suggest increasing board level infonnation processing and decision making 
capabilities by including multiple boards for different stakeholders to create a division of 
power and labour which would support superior risk management.281 Furthermore an 
ecological form of network governance could reduce the size, scope, cost and 
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intrusiveness of government and their regulators while improving economic efficiency, 
resiliency and enriching democracy with widespread citizen stakeholder engagement.282 
3. 9. Conclusion 
This chapter sets out to discuss the various theories underlying the development of 
corporate governance and the areas it encompasses. The findings show that the 
development of corporate governance has been affected by theories from a number of 
disciplines, including finance, economics, accotmting and law. The main theory was also 
seen to be agency theory, although stakeholder theory is coming into play because it takes 
into account a wider group of constituents rather than focusing just on shareholders . The 
critiques and justification for each theory was also taken into account. 
In conclusion, it is fair to say that corporate governance is still seeking its theoretical 
foundations and as yet does not have a single widely accepted theoretical base that 
adequately reflects its reality. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Corporate Governance Regulation Systems 
4.1. Introduction 
The first chapter of this study established that the main issue with the guidelines for 
corporate governance are premised on a 'comply or explain' approach. This threshold as 
highlighted in the paper is unable to hold directors and internal auditors accountable 
before the consequences of bad governance crystalize. This study hopes to come up with 
possible solutions by suggesting preventive legal measures that will engender good 
corporate governance in institutions. 
The study is focused on corporate governance in the banking sector and the second chapter 
highlighted the corporate governance regime in the sector with emphasis on its failures. 
The chapter also looked at the historical perspective of corporate governance in Kenya 
and its adoption in the banking sector. 
The failure of corporate governance in the banking sector was illustrated by the collapse 
of Chase Bank, Imperial Bank and the Bank of Dubai. It was clear that the failure of the 
three banks was on account of poor corporate governance practices. Chapter two brought 
to the fore the shortcomings of the 'comply and explain' rule in ensuring most banking 
institutions adhere to rules of good governance. The overarching research question that 
the study seeks to answer is whether corporate governance is failing within the banking 
sector in Kenya primarily due to lack of sufficient preventive legal measures. 
In an attempt to get a solution, this chapter will undertake a comparative study of 
corporate governance in the USA, the UK and in Kenya. In so doing, we will delve into 
possible approaches such as the half mandatory half explanatory found in the USA under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a possible intervention to the lack of preventive legal measures. 
The comparative study will inquire into the practicality of any proposed approach from 
an implementation perspective. 
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The rationalisation for using the US and the UK for this comparative study is that they 
represent two of the most advanced countries in tenns of corporate governance. 283 Further, 
the US patterned its system after the UK, so this provides an appropriate comparison for 
Kenya, which also copied a lot from its former colonial master. 
Scholars of corporate governance globally appear to be in agreement that there are two 
basic corporate governance systems viz. the Anglo-American Shareholder system and the 
Continental European/Japanese Stakeholder system. 284 The two models are used in 
contrast to explain differences in finance, ownership, labour relations, the role of the 
market as well as to explore the possibilities of convergence or continued divergence in 
corporate governance practices.285 
The three jurisdictions this section wishes to compare and contrast all fall within the 
Anglo-American shareholder system. Scholars have shown more interest in the 
differences between the basic models; the Anglo-American shareholder system and the 
Continental European/Japanese Stakeholc,ler system. Not much attention has been paid to 
the differences within the Anglo-American shareholder system present in Kenya, USA 
and the UK. Although there are significant similarities, there exist salient differences that 
call for discussion. There is a lot that can be learnt from our British and American 
counterparts on how to ensure compliance with good corporate governance. 
4.2. Application of the Agency Theory 
As discussed previously and in detail in the third chapter, the main features in the Anglo-
American shareholder system (and that are present in Kenya, USA and the UK) can be 
linked to the agency theory. The agency theory is considered to have had the most 
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influence in the development of corporate governance as well as providing the theoretical 
framework. 286 
The study will compare the corporate governance systems in Kenya, USA and the UK 
from an Agency Theory perspective. The objective is to identify the differences and 
similarities within their corporate governance systems. In this regard, there will be two 
main points of comparison. The first is ownership, which will consider the main 
shareholders in each country and how that influences corporate governance. The second 
is control, which will consider how the law in each country understands directorship. 
4.3. Corporate Governance Regulation in the US 
4.3.1. Ownership 
Review of scholarship in the area of corporate governance reveals that most corporate 
governance systems can be categorised into two: a dispersed ownership system and a 
concentrated ownership system. A dispersed ownership system is characterised by strong 
securities, rigorous disclosure systems, high share turnover and high market transparency 
in which the market for corporate constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism while 
a concentrated ownership system is characterised by controlling block holders, weaker 
security markets, high private benefits of control and lower disclosure and market 
transparency but with a possibly substitutionary role played by large banks and non-
controlling block holders.287 
In the USA the ownership system is the. dispersed ownership system. 288 It is widely 
accepted that this system is susceptible to gatekeeper failure as illustrated by the wave of 
financial irregularity in the USA culminating in the Sarbanes - Oxley Act. However, it 
should be noted that while gatekeeper failure is present in both ownership systems, in 
dispersed ownership systems the villains are managers and the victims are shareholders.289 
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Before proceeding it is crucial for the study to address what a gatekeeper is and what 
constitutes gatekeeper failure. The phrase "corporate gatekeeper" typically refers to 
extemal agents-auditors, analysts, credit rating agencies, and the like. Coffee lays out 
three criteria that define a gatekeeper as an independent professional who: (1) acts as 
reputational intermediary between the corporation and investors, (2) is positioned to 
prevent wrongdoing, and (3) is susceptible to significant reputational capital to 
depreciation or depletion ifhe or she were found to have condoned wrongdoing.290 When 
they are unable to protect dispersed investors in the ownership system in USA, UK and 
Kenya (the dispersed ownership system) we can reasonably term it gatekeeper failure . 
Moving on, we proceed to look at the different forms of ownership in the USA, UK and 
Kenya. These are: Executive ownership, board ownership, employee ownership (non-
executive), block holders, agent owners and private equity. These can be grouped into 
inside ownership; executives, board and employees and outside ownership; block holders, 
agent and private equity. 
Inside ownership is meant to cure a fundamental problem of agency relationships. A little 
background is needed here. For Eisenhardt, agency theory is concemed with resolving 
two problems that can occur in agency relationships; 1) conflicting desires between the 
principal and the agent and 2) the difficulty and the high costs involved when the principal 
tries to verify what the agent is doing. 291 
Eisenhardt is not alone in identifying the problems with the agency relationship discussed 
in agency theory. Indeed, we can confidently say that potential problems with agency 
theory are quite well documented. As early as the 181h Century, Smith pointed out that the 
directors of corporations being managers of other people's money rather than their own, 
cannot be expected to watch over it with the same anxious vigilance as if it were their 
own.292 
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This problem can be expressed as self-interest or opportunism on the part of the agent.293 
In agency theory the shareholder expects the agent to act and make decisions in the best 
interests of the shareholder. However this many not always be the case and there are a 
number of dimensions to this; the agent may not act in the interest of the principal at all, 
he may act just partially in the interest of the principal, infonnation asymmetry where the 
agent has access to more infom1ation and thus putting the principal at a disadvantage. 294 
The position that agents will always act in their self-interest is one put forward by those 
who, using the economic model of rationality, assume that rational individuals are self-
interested and act only from egoistic or altruistic motives. 295 
These are the problems inside ownership seeks to resolve. The managerial mischief that 
is likely to occur when interests of firm's owners and managers diverge. It has been 
suggested that the firms can solve this problem by aligning agent and owner interests 
either through agent's equity ownership or structure of their compensation. 296 
Incentive alignment of this kind includes two related elements. The first being financial 
alignment, whereby an agent's economic rewards are in line with those of owners through 
ownership.297 This is what this subsection looks at, inside ownership. The second element 
of incentive alignment is alignment of preferences and actions, whereby the agent's 
preferences become more aligned with those of owners, and the agent's choice of actions, 
though still motivated by self-interest, is more consistent with owner interests.298 Having 
looked at the benefits of inside ownership, it is apt to take a closer look at the forms of 
inside ownership in the UK, USA and Kenya. It should be noted that these forms of 
ownership are present across all three and are discussed simultaneously. 
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The first is executive ownership. Executive ownership is simply executives (managers) 
own equity with the appeal being that as executives have greater ownership stake, they 
are more likely to employ firm resources towards long-tenn profitability and less likely 
to shirk from executing their fiscal and strategic responsibilities.299 At the same time, 
however, other scholars note the potential pernicious effects of managerial ownership. 
High levels of ownership, for example, may provide executives with increased power, 
which can cause them to become entrenched within the firm. 300 Once entrenched, 
managers may consume more perquisites and/or reduce the finn's risk profile to protect 
their own interests. 
Empirical research has been consistent with these contrasting perspectives on the effects 
of managerial ownership. Results of various studies have brought mixed results. Some 
studies reveal that executive ownership leads to greater risk taking whereas others report 
the opposite, less risk taking. 301 With respect to goal alignment, results have been similar. 
Some studies have sought to establish a link between managerial ownership and goal 
alignment, but other research has found that managerial ownership may as often lead to 
goal misalignment with respect to such issues as backdating of stock options, earnings 
manipulation, and dividend policies.302 
Board ownership is the second type of inside ownership and is quite similar to executive 
ownership. They are both meant to achieve goal alignment. The difference is that board 
ownership refers to independent directors that sit on the board. However, there hasn ' t been 
research on these outside directors holding equity as from an agency theory perspective, 
they should represent the interests of shareholders. 303 
The third type of inside ownership is non-executive employees owning at least some stock 
in the firm. Thousands of finns are structured this way in the UK and the USA not only 
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to achieve goal alignment but also to create a socio-psychological bond that affects job 
attitudes positively. 304 This socio-psychological bond is linked to effectiveness, 
satisfaction and job performance. 305 
Outside ownership is seen by some as complimentary to the alignment approach seen in 
inside ownership, since it may motivate shareholders to monitor the activities of managers 
closely.306 It is also known as the control approach. Before proceeding it is important to 
note that much of the literature on individual ownership is focused on inside owners such 
as executives. Individual owners are often ignored or lumped together with institutional 
investors when discussing outside ownership. It should be noted as well that the forms of 
outside ownership discussed here are found across the board in USA, the UK and Kenya. 
The first type of outside ownership has to do with block holders. These are investors with 
more than a 5% equity stake in a firm. 307 In essence, block holders are large shareholders. 
They have a huge role to play in corporate governance because their sizeable stakes give 
them the most incentive to bear the cost of monitoring managers. 308 Block holders can be 
private individuals, family members, institutional investors such as firms and corporations 
or state ownership. Block holders are mainly motivated by two factors; concentrated 
control and private benefit. Concentrated control arises from the superior monitoring that 
block holders can perfonn via concentrated decision rights while private benefits are those 
that accrue through their ability to use their power over management. 
Individual block holders tend to be inside block holders and are therefore part of inside 
ownership. Institutional block holders, on the other hand are firmly part of outside 
ownership and examples of such institutions include banks, insurance firms and pension 
funds. Some scholars conjecture that institutional investors gravitation towards companies 
that have better governance structures is likely to be stronger than that of individual 
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investors. 309 This is based on institutional investors having strong fiduciary 
responsibilities since most of them are banks, insurance companies and pension funds as 
well as the tendency of institutional investors having more incentive to monitor managers 
more actively due to the large stake they hold. Further, institutional investors know that 
they need to do more monitoring and tend to prefer firms which have better disclosure 
rankings and in tum better governance structures to reduce monitoring costs. 
State ownership in the USA is not very popular and this has been attributed to its status 
as a developed country and its libe1iarian mindset. This is because state ownership tends 
to be higher in emerging economies and those with poorer protection of prope1iy rights. 
However, this is not to say that there is no state ownership in developed countries such as 
the USA, state ownership occurs in this country where it steps in as a result of market 
failures. 
State ownership in the USA takes the fonn of subtle around investors that are broadly 
categorized as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs); these are investment vehicles owned and 
managed by a national government. 310 SWF's have invested large sums of capital into 
firms in the USA and the UK and this has led to concern over their transparency and their 
potential for preferring political interests and gains over economic and strategic gains. 311 
However most of the evidence for such claims appear to be anecdotal as there isn't too 
much academic research into it. 
The final type of outside ownership present in the USA is agent ownership. Agent owners 
are a set of outside owners that invest in the firm as representatives of an underlying 
fractionated ownership.312 This creates a dual agency relationship wherein shareholders 
serve as principals, discharging duties with regard to managerial agents, and also as agents 
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who are themselves charged with the duty of investing towards particular objectives of 
ultimate shareholders in a particular fund. 
There are multiple grounds to make one believe that agent owners are able to overcome 
obstacles to firm governance encountered by other shareholders. Agent owners represent 
fractionated clients who sign over their voting rights, centralizing bargaining power in a 
single entity and avoiding campaign costs.313 Owing to a changing regulatory 
environment witnessed in UK and USA in their favour, agent owners can sometimes 
combine their bargaining strength. 314 With their large holdings, these owners have the 
incentive and resources to monitor firm actions. 
Institutional ownership is the most popular in the USA. A study of the top 1000 
corporations reveals they have institutional ownership of up to 73%.315 96% ofUS firms 
have at least one block holder and as discussed earlier block holders tend to be 
institutions.316 In the analysis of corporate governance in the USA, any meaningful 
discussion ought to begin with the fact that between 60% and 70% of the shares of medium 
and large public corporations are held by institutional investors, and that even in the 
largest corporations, a significant percentage of the shares are held by a handful of 
investors. Two factors seem to have driven the trends over time: regulation; and market 
forces. The extraordinary growth of institutional investors in the US is as a result of two 
key factors: regulation and market forces. 317 An example of such regulation is the 
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) a federal 
law that sets minimum standards for most voluntarily established retirement and health 
plans in private industry to provide protection for individuals in these plans. 
This eventually pushed corporations to shift to "defined contribution" plans in which the 
employer and employee each contribute to a tax-advantaged retirement account (almost 
313 Connelly Bet a!, 'Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance', 1564. 
314 Connelly B eta!, 'Ownership as a Fonn of Corporate Governance', 1564. 
315 Rock E, 'Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance' Faculty Scholarship University of 
Pennsylvania, paper 1458, 5. 
316 Edmans A, 'Blockholders and Corporate Governance', 2. 
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invariably managed by a mutual fund) to support the employee after retirement. From an 
employer's perspective, the great virtue of a "defined contribution" plan is that it is fully 
funded from the beginning and all investment risk falls on the employee. Thus, began the 
growth of institutional investors in the US. 
4.3.2. Control in the US 
The US follows the Anglo- American model that is based on a single tiered (one-tiered) 
Board of Directors, which is primarily comprised of non-executive directors who have 
been elected by shareholders. Some single tiered boards have both executive and non-
executive directors, while others may have the CEO serving as the Chairman of the Board, 
creating CEO/Chair duality, and then utilizing separate functional committees, for 
example, audit, nomination and compensation committees. 318 
One should not gloss over the importance of the board of directors in corporate 
govemance given the n1ultiplicity of agency control mechanisms available to it and in 
operation. 319 The Board of Directors which has the power to hire, fire, and compensate 
senior managers teams serves to resolve conflicts of interest among decision maker 
residual risk bearers. This economizes the transaction (agency) costs associated with the 
separation (specialization) of ownership and control and the survival of the open 
corporation as an organizational form. Thus, it is not surprising to find that state 
corporation laws, in the US, require that the affairs of business corporations be managed 
under the guidance of a board of directors. 320 
Initially in the US, there was a laissez-faire attitude towards board of directors as the law 
was silent on board composition, size, structure, director compensation, ratio of insiders 
to outsiders, organisational affiliations of outsiders and even matters as salient as 
independence of directors both individually and as a group.321 Inevitably these led to 
318 RockE, 'Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance',5. 
319 Baysinger Band Butler H, 'Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Perfonnance Effects of 
Changes in Board Composition' 1 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 1, 1985, 105. 
320 Baysinger B and Butler H, 'Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of 
Changes in Board Composition', 105 . 
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Changes in 
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shareholder abuses as selection of directors was left virtually at the discretion of the very 
patties whose behaviour the board was supposed to monitor. 
Following the financial failures ofEnron and other major corporations in the early 2000's, 
there was an increased interest in corporate governance and questions were raised as to 
the adequacy of the regulations in force which scrutiny gave impetus for the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 which was an addition to the Securities Acts of 1933 and 
1934 and legislated specific revisions to the framework for corporate governance in the 
United States.322 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressed many of the problems resulting from an unregulated 
board of directors by requiring that a majority of the directors on the board be 
independent, requiring independent director approval of director nominations and 
executive officer compensation, expanded the scope of audit committee authority and 
tightened the qualification requirements for audit committee members. 323 
4.4. Corporate Govemance Regulation in the UK 
Since the forms of ownership are similar to the US, we shall proceed to look at the pattern 
of share ownership. This pattern of share ownership in the UK reveals that institutional 
investors own nearly forty percent of UK equity while individual investors account for 
only ten percent of UK equity. 324 Overseas shareholders (who are predominantly 
institutional shareholders as well) own the rest. From this we can see institutional 
shareholders have become quite powerful in the UK and this has led to an expectation that 
they play an active role in the companies in which they invest. Led by Paul Myners, the 
Myners Review in 2001 was a wide-ranging report covering fund management, trustees, 
life insurance which revealed that despite their power and influence, institutional investors 
seemed reluctant to intervene or even take action in underperfonning companies. 325 
Board Composition' , 102. 
322 Meier H and Meier N, 'Corporate Governance: An Examination of U.S and European Models' 9 
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In response to the findings of the Myners Review of 2001, the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee issued a statement on the responsibilities of institutional shareholders. In the 
statement they listed some of the things they felt were in the realm of responsibility of 
institutional shareholders such as monitoring performance and intervening when 
necessary. 326 Overall, the statement aimed at enhancing how effectively institutional 
shareholders discharge their responsibilities in relation to the companies in which they 
invest.327 To their credit, the Institutional Shareholders Committee released a statement 
every two years from 2002 culminating in the Code on Responsibilities of Institutional 
Investors of 2009.328 
In terms of control, the UK also follows the Anglo-American model that is based on a 
single tiered board of directors. The structure and composition of the board of directors 
is based on the Combined Code on Corporate Governance. This code establishes good 
governance practices relating to the role and the composition of the board. However, the 
UK operates in a 'comply or explain' system, which allows companies to adopt a different 
approach most suited to them.329 The companies are only required to explain the reasons 
for non-compliance to their shareholders who then must decide if the approach chosen is 
acceptable. This 'comply or explain' approach enables judgments about many issues, 
including the independence of non-executive directors, on a case-by-case basis. This 
system exemplifies the importance of the relationship between the company and its 
shareholders and not between the company and the regulators which in turn, has gained 
strong support from companies, investors and regulators in the UK with some even 
claiming that 'UK was ranked as the leading country in terms of corporate governance" 
and these more favorable requirements were a major reason why some companies chose 
to list their securities in the UK rather than in the U.S. 330 
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4.5. Corporate Governance Regulation in Kenya 
As the forms of ownership are essentially the same, we proceed directly to the pattern of 
share ownership. First is state ownership, which is more common in Kenya than in the 
UK and the USA. In a study of ownership and corporate governance and its effects on 
banks the researchers asked respondents to indicate the percentage of shares owned by 
the state for the banks surveyed. The findings show that in the banks surveyed, though the 
state still had majority shares of over 70% it was evident that the state was gradually 
withdrawing from active participation in some banks by periodically offloading shares as 
some respondents noted. 
As this study focuses on corporate governance in banks, it is apt to utilize a study 
conducted on types of ownership in Kenyan banks. 40% of the banks that participated in 
the study were foreign owned, 32.5% had substantive government participation while 
27.5% were locally owned. Of these banks, 80% of them were listed as finns in the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange. At least managers and workers held between 0 -5 percent 
of the shares in local banks as 20% of respondents in the study noted while in foreign-
owned banks employees owned up to 20% of the shares. Domestic individual investors, 
domestic institutional investors and foreign investors each owned up to 25% of shares. 331 
In terms of control, Kenya still utilizes the Anglo-American model of a single tiered board 
of directors. For banks, there a number of stipulations for the board of directors that are 
set out by the Central Bank of Kenya. Firstly, the board must have a non-executive 
director who is not involved in the day to day running as well as not being a full-time 
salaried employee of the banking institution or its subsidiaries and secondly the board 
must have an independent non-executive director who has not been employed by the 
institution in any executive capacity within the last five years and does not have any 
conflicting interests within the institution.332 Additionally, no shareholder with more than 
five percent in a banking institution is allowed to be an executive director or form pati of 
the management of the institution. The CBK has more guidelines on the board of directors 
331 Mang'unyi E, 'Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance and Its Effects on Performance: A Case 
of Selected Banks in Kenya' , 8. 
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such as; all institutions' board to have at least five directors, three-fifths of whom should 
be non-executive Directors. For foreign banks, a local committee is a mandatory 
requirement. 333 
4. 6. Compliance Issues 
Kenya leans heavily towards the comply-or-explain framework which yields very little 
compliance as evinced by the failures of the banks. The 'comply or explain' framework 
falls short of its mandate because it does not give sufficient impetus for companies or 
institutions to comply. Other than the mandatory laws that are given force through statute, 
the other rules serve at best as pointed suggestions giving leeway for companies to decide 
whether or not to be bound. 
The result of non-compliance has led to Kenya witnessing the collapse of at least three 
mid-tier banks: Dubai,334 Imperial335 and Chase.336 These failures can largely be attributed 
to lapses in the corporate govemance framework. The failure of Chase bank can be 
narrowed down to irregular insider lending at the behest of the directors whereas at . 
Imperial Bank it was a conspiracy between senior bank officials to defraud depositors.337 
The failure of these banks has not only impacted depositors negatively but has affected 
the banking sector in its entirety. 
4. 7. Limits of the Law 
The law on corporate govemance in Kenya has clearly had its limits as demonstrated by 
the failures of banks. The main laws that would come into play in remedying ills of 
corporate govemance would be The Companies Act, The Capital Markets Act and Nairobi 
Securities Exchange (NSE) Rules and the Penal Code. Although, the extent to which the 
law can promote good govemance is limited, our laws are not doing enough at present. 
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Earlier discussions revealed how the law may have inadvertently left room for directors 
to exploit shareholders' interests by allowing the authorisation by co-directors of a 
director who may be conflicted to act regardless of the conflict. Additionally, the law 
provides that it is not necessary for the director to declare an interest if the other directors 
are already aware of it. Furthennore, there is no liability that attaches to the directors if 
they are guilty of making untrue statements or reckless declarations. 
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to undertake a comparative study of corporate governance in the USA, 
UK and Kenya. The involved a look into the similarities and differences of Kenya' s, the 
UK's and USA's corporate governance systems through the lens of agency theorist's 
ownership and control. The findings show that institutional investors dominated 
ownership and control (management) is done through the board of directors. 
The difference in approaches between the UK, Kenya and the USA are stark when it 
comes to the board of directors . The UK and Kenya have a lax comply or explain system 
while the USA has a mandatory compliance system courtesy of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
system- although some term it as half mandatory and half explanatory. This will be 
explored further in chapter 5 as a potential panacea to the problem at hand in Kenya. 
Chapter 5 will also make recommendations on the same. 
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CHAPTERS 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1. Introduction 
This study set out to explore the corporate governance landscape in the Kenyan banking 
sector. This is in the wake of multiple failures of corporate governance in the sector as 
evidenced by the collapse of Chase Bank, Imperial Bank and Dubai Bank. The billions of 
shillings lost on account of those three banks illustrate the magnitude and impact of poor 
corporate governance. 
The fall of these three banks had a direct co-relation with poor corporate governance. The 
Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) when issuing a moratorium on licensing of banks in the 
wake of this crisis claimed the issues were "isolated and unique to the two firms" due to 
weak internal governance controls and not systemic to the entire industry. 338 It is clear 
that they recognize the failure of the banks was occasioned by the lack of good corporate 
governance but to tetm the three incidents as isolated on the part of CBK is in my view 
not a true representation of the facts. 
In the case of Chase Bank, its collapse was attributed to directors accessmg loans 
irregularly. An audit conducted on the bank revealed that the directors advanced 
themselves up to USD 80 million. In Dubai Bank, directors engaged in dubious 
transactions by forcing the bank to undergo a liquidity crisis while at imperial bank it was 
outright conspiracy to defraud the bank. The common thread here is no doubt failure of 
corporate governance. 
This study set out to establish how best good corporate governance can be engendered in 
the banking sector given the limitations of the law. This chapter seeks to summarize the 
main findings of the study, corresponding to the objectives set out in the first chapter. It 
will then proceed to make specific recommendations on regulatory reform and legal 
refonn that would avail a more robust corporate governance framework in the Kenyan 
338 Central Bank of Kenya, Declaration of Moratorium on Licencing of Banks, 17 November 20 15 . 
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banking sector. Refonns that would put in place preventive legal measures that will 
compel entities to embrace good governance. 
5.2. Summary of Major Findings 
5.2.1. Current Corporate Governance Framework in Kenya 
This subsection discusses the findings of Chapter Two. Chapter Two explored the current 
corporate governance framework in Kenya as well as the dynamics of its application and 
efficiency in regulating institutions. The chapter also analysed the factors that contributed 
to the failure of Dubai Bank, Chase Bank and Imperial Bank. 
To understand the framework of corporate governance in Kenya, it was necessary to delve 
into its history. A brief historical perspective of corporate governance in the UK preceded 
this-as Kenya borrowed heavily from it. It was interesting to note that prior to the UK 
putting into place a robust corporate governance regime, they had their fair share of 
institutional collapses on account of poor corporate governance. The period between the 
1980s and 1990s witnessed the collapse ofthe Ferranti International PLC, Colorol Group, 
Pollypeck International PLC, Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and 
Maxwell Communication Corporation. 
The chapter then looked at the major developments that followed in the UK aimed at 
addressing this failure of corporate governance. The first intervention was the Cadbury 
Code emanating from the Cadbury Committee chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury which 
attempted to set out in writing a code that was to inform the expected standards of financial 
reporting and auditing and eventually be reflected in a Code of Best Practice. This may 
be heralded as the first attempt to codify already recognised practices and render them 
universally applicable as well as offer added incentive for companies to adhere to them. 
The code was presented to companies as being voluntary but with the caveat that 
companies should explain in their annual reports the extent of their compliance as well as 
any reasons for non-compliance- the 'comply or explain' alluded to earlier. 
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The Greenbury Report followed the Cadbury Report and it centred around the somewhat 
controversial issue of remuneration of company directors. Part of the report recommended 
that director's remuneration should not be excessive, that there be a direct link between 
shareholder interests and directors' interests, share amounts to directors should not be 
offered at a discount among other considerations. 339 The report further suggested that 
there be full disclosure provided for directors' remuneration. All this infonnation, it was 
recommended, should be detailed and set out in an annual report. 34° Chapter Two also 
detailed the findings of the Hampel Report which echoed the Greenbury and Cadbury 
reports before they were all combined into the 1998 combined report which fortified the 
'comply or explain' approach we see today. 
This background laid the basis for a study of Kenya's history of corporate governance. 
The findings reveal that institutional failure is not new to Kenya. Seven banks and more 
than ten financial institutions had already collapsed before the tum of the year 1994. 
Between 2000 and 2006 six more banks collapsed. Chase Bank, Imperial Bank and Dubai 
Bank only seem to have perpetuated the poor corporate governance practices that have 
plagued our banking sector. The chapter then proceeds to look at the law governing 
corporate governance. 
The findings reveal that Kenya has a corporate governance framework in the form of the 
Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public 20 15 and 
a regulatory body in the Capital Markets Authority. The various laws governing corporate 
governance in Kenya, include the Constitution ofKenya, the Companies Act, the Capital 
Markets Act, the Nairobi Securities Exchange Rules, the Banking Act, Prudential 
Guidelines and the Penal Code. 
The chapter goes on to review these laws in an attempt to figure out the cause of their 
ineffectiveness. The findings reveal that the law may have inadvertently left room for 
directors to exploit shareholder interests by allowing the authorisation by co-directors of 
a director who may be conflicted to act regardless of the conflict. Additionally, the law 
339 Report ofthe Committee on Corporate Governance, January 1998, para 6.5 and 6.7. 
340 Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, January 1998, para 5.8 and 5.12. 
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provides that it is not necessary for the director to declare an interest if the other directors 
are already aware of it. Furthermore, there is no liability that attaches to the directors if 
they are guilty of making untrue statements or reckless declarations 
The final part of the chapter goes into more detail on the banking crisis in Kenya, 
analysing at length the collapse of Dubai Bank, Imperial Bank and Chase Bank. 
Ultimately it can easily be narrowed down to poor corporate governance practises and its 
perhaps indicative of a system in urgent need of preventive legal measures. Probable 
solutions will be discussed in the recommendations. 
5.2.2. Theories of Corporate Governance 
This chapter was useful in elucidating on the theories on what makes an efficient corporate 
governance framework. An analysis of the theories on corporate governance provides a 
basis for understanding the issue in greater depth. Identifying the most suitable theory for 
corporate governance in a country such as Kenya may not be easy. Corporate governance 
is a global phenomenon bringing with it legal, cultural and structural differences thus 
some theories may be more relevant and appropriate to one country than they are to 
another. 
The findings revealed that the theories that affect corporate governance are quite varied 
as would be expected given the many disciplines that have influenced its growth. Some 
of the theories that may be associated with corporate governance may include; Agency, 
transaction cost economics, stakeholder, stewardship, class hegemony, managerial 
hegemony, path dependence, resource dependence, institutional, political and network 
governance. 
The findings show that the main theory behind corporate governance systems all over the 
world is agency theory. Agency Theory having its roots in economic theory can be defined 
as the relationship between the principals, such as shareholders, and agents such as the 
company executives and managers. 341 Its sheer simplicity in reducing the management of 
341 Abdullah H and Valentine B, 'Fundamental Ethics and Theories of Corporate Governance' Middle 
Eastern Finance and Economics, 2009, 89. 
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a corporation to just two levels (managers and shareholders) has been deemed a major 
factor in its prominence. 342 
The problems of Agency Theory and its resulting agency relationship are heavily linked 
with the problems witnessed in the collapse of our banking institutions. This is due to the 
conflicting desires between the principal and the agent and leads to directors acting the 
way they do. In fact, as early as the 18111 Century, Adam Smith put it aptly by stating that 
the directors of corporations being managers of other people's money rather than their 
own, cannot be expected to watch over it with the same anxious vigilance as if it were 
their own. 343 
This problem can be expressed as self-interest or opportunism on the part of the agent.344 
In Agency Theory the shareholder expects the agent to act and make decisions in the best 
interests of the shareholder, but the exact opposite has been witnessed in the banking 
crises in Kenya. Agency Theory helps in understanding the situation better especially with 
its view of corporations being set in the context of separation of ownership and control. 
With investors or shareholders being the owners and directors taking control. The 
challenge of self-interest as discussed earlier manifests itself quite well in the discussion 
on separation of ownership and control. A growing tendency among corporations has been 
to dilute controlling blocks of shares leading to a situation that can be described as 
ownership without power.345 These powerless owners have had to watch as directors 
overpay themselves, scandals unfold, and failures occur. 
Agency Theory is particularly crucial to this study since its regarded by some as an 
essential tool for analysing and understanding the spate of corporate ethics scandals. 346 
The findings from investigating the Agency Theory provided this study with some 
mechanisms of countering the conflicts of agency relationships; 
342 Abdullah Hand Valentine B, 'Fundamental Ethics and Theories of Corporate Governance' , 89 . 
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1. No duality, that is, one person should not hold the position of CEO and Chairman 
of the Board to avoid managerial opportunism and agency loss; 
2. Provision of financial incentives to managers: including fixing executive 
compensation and levels ofbenefits linked to shareholders' returns; 
3. Introduction and inclusion of more independent directors on the board; 
4. Direct intervention by shareholders and the threat of firing the underperfonning 
managers (shareholder activism); and 
5. An active market for corporate control: The threat of a hostile takeover disciplines 
managerial behavior and induces managers to attempt to maximize shareholder 
value. 
Most of these can be applied to the problems we have seen in our corporate governance 
system and will be discussed further in the recommendations. 
The chapter then discussed Stewardship Theory, which does not stress the perspective of 
individualism, but rather on the role of top management being stewards, integrating their 
goals as part of the organization. The stewardship perspective suggests that stewards are 
satisfied and motivated when organizational success is attained. 347 The theory recognizes 
the importance of structures that are geared and built towards maximum autonomy and 
trust in an effort to empower the steward. It is kind of the antithesis of agency theory, for 
example while agency calls for protection of shareholders' interests by separation of 
incumbency of roles of board and chair, stewardship theory argues that shareholders' 
interests are maximised by shared incumbency of these roles . In other words, the 
stewardship model can be summarised as one where shareholders empower and trust 
stewards who in tum get both intrinsically and extrinsically motivated to perfmm in a way 
that protects and maximizes shareholders' wealth. 
A survey of Kenyan firms listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange between 2004 and 
2007 revealed that most surveyed firms tended to favour outside directorships over inside 
347 Abdullah Hand Valentine B, 'Fundamental Ethics and Theories of Corporate Governance ' , 90. 
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directorships. The prevalence of outside directorships was twice as much compared to 
inside directorships. This tends to favour the competing Agency Theory over Stewardship 
Theory. Further, the study showed that finns surveyed tended towards having different 
persons occupying the two positions of CEO and board chairman, something that is in 
line with Agency Theory. 348 These results reveal that Agency Theory is dominant over 
Stewardship Theory or at least more prevalent in Kenya. This dominance explains why 
most codes of best practice so far advanced by different bodies and countries including 
the CMA have some kind of bias towards implementing the Agency Theory 
recommendations. 
The chapter then proceeded to discuss the Stakeholder Theory. The Stakeholder Theory 
takes into account of a wider group of constituents rather than focusing on only 
shareholders. The findings show that Stakeholder Theory does not provide a single 
corporate objective but directs managers to serve many "Masters". It became clear from 
the findings that without the clarity of mission provided by a single valued objective 
function; companies embracing stakeholder theory will experience managerial confusion, 
conflict, inefficiency and loss of competitive advantage. 
Transaction Cost Economic Theory was the last of the major theories discussed. While 
agency theory looks at the tendency of directors to act in their own best interests, pursuing 
salary and status, TCE theory considers that managers (or directors) may atTange 
transactions in an opportunistic way. So how then is the Transaction Cost Economics 
Theory relevant to corporate governance? If assets are non-specific, there is no need of 
having corporate governance structures. This is because there are no complex transactions 
to be carried out. A simple transaction such as purchasing milk has little uncertainty to it, 
low asset specificity and no risk, therefore it is a straight fmward transaction.349 Therefore, 
the Transaction Cost Economics Theory goes ahead to explain why such simple 
transactions are organised in a buyer-seller market and provides insight on why complex 
348 Aduda J, Chogii Rand Magutu P, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Corporate Governance Theories on 
The Perfonnance of Finns Listed at The Nairobi Securities Exchange' 9 European Scientific Journal 13, 
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349 Ketokivi M and Mahoney J, 'Transaction cost economics as a theory of the firm, management and 
governance', 8. 
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transaction require complex governance structures. 350 Governance structures can be seen 
as a way ofinternalising and making decisions that have not been thought out in the initial 
contract. 351 The TCE approach ensures that governance decisions are held accountable at 
every decision-making level to ensure maximisation of benefit and the economisation of 
costs. 
5.2.3. A Comparative Study of Corporate Governance 
A comparative study of the USA, the UK and Kenya was imperative. In undertaking the 
comparative analysis, the study interrogated approaches in the USA under the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act as a possible solution to the lack of preventive legal measures. The comparative 
study considered the practicality of the proposed solution by way of in-depth analysis of 
the legal systems of the United Kingdom and The United States of America which have 
received praise for fostering strong and good protection for minority shareholders 
resulting in a more diversified shareholder base. 352 
The findings of the comparative study illustrated the similarities between the three 
countries in the field of corporate governance, which makes it easier to adopt approaches 
from those legal systems. The first similarity from the study was the presence of a 
dispersed ownership system in all three countries. A dispersed ownership system is 
characterised by strong securities, rigorous disclosure systems, high share turnover and 
high market transparency. The study then looked into the different forms of ownership in 
the USA, UK and Kenya. These are: executive ownership, board ownership, employee 
ownership (non-executive), block holders, agent owners and private equity. These can be 
grouped into inside ownership; executives, board and employees and outside ownership; 
block holders, agent and private equity. 
The comparative study revealed further how the US initially faced challenges due to the 
laissezfaire approach towards a board of directors, but this was resolved by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. It fixed many of the problems resulting from an unref:,rulated board of directors 
350 Williamson 0 , The economic institutions of capitalism, 1985, 52. 
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by requiring that a majority of the directors on the board be independent, requiring 
independent director approval of director nominations and executive officer 
compensation, expanded the scope of audit committee authority and tightened the 
qualification requirements for audit committee members. In the UK, the stmcture and 
composition of the board of directors is based on the Combined Code on Corporate 
Govemance. This code establishes good govemance practices relating to the role and the 
composition of the board. However, the UK operates in a ' comply or explain' system, 
which allows companies to adopt a different approach most suited to them. 
This section deals with recommendations; suggestions and proposals that this author 
believes can be successfully implemented to hold directors and internal auditors 
accountable before the consequences of bad governance crystallize. The 
recommendations are informed by the need to have preventive legal measures that 
behooves corporate entities to good govemance. 
5.3. Recommendations for Corporate Governance in Kenya 
5.3.1. Mandatory Governance Legislation 
From the preceding discussion in this study on corporate govemance it becomes clear that 
the main issue with the corporate govemance system in Kenya is that it works on the 
premise of 'comply or explain'. This threshold as highlighted in the study is unable to 
hold directors and intemal auditors to account before the consequences of bad govemance 
materialize. 
The first recommendation of this study is that the 'comply or explain' govemance system 
be replaced by mandatory govemance mles. The Sarbanes Oxley Act introduced 
mandatory rules and as evidenced by the comparative study; it greatly improved their 
corporate govemance regime. While there are many incentives for corporations to adopt 
corporate govemance principles voluntarily, Kenyan banking institutions have not shown 
a propensity to do so. 
The comply-or-explain regime is insufficient, since there is no guarantee that all fitms 
will implement the reforms necessary to provide investors with adequate checks on 
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agency problems. On this view, mandatory corporate governance is a necessary tool for 
the protection of investors. A mandatory governance regime will yield better compliance 
and will go a long way in preventing institutional failure in the banking industry. The 
author proposes legal consequences for failure to meet certain guidelines. For instance, if 
a company fails to put in place an external remuneration committee they ought to be guilty 
for material non-compliance. 
The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) should enforce these consequences. Section 33 of the 
CBK Act gives it the power to monitor any bank in Kenya. This study focuses on poor 
corporate governance in banking institutions and for that reason alone if for no other, the 
CBK is the most appropriate body as an enforcement mechanism. The use of the CBK is 
ideal, as it falls squarely within their mandate. 
5.3.2. Partially Mandatory; Partially Voluntary Governance Regime 
It is worth noting that several institutions have adopted corporate governance practices in 
the absence of a requirement to do so. It is for this reason that the second recommendation 
calls for a part mandatory part voluntary corporate governance regime. Particularly one 
coupled with mandatory disclosure of a firm's governance practices. There is evidence 
that this part mandatory part voluntary approach is likely to yield a higher level of 
compliance at lower costs to the issuer than a wholly mandatory regime. 353 While a wholly 
mandatory structure may yield slightly better compliance, its other benefits are unce1iain, 
and its costs are likely much higher. 
For this partially mandatory pa1iially voluntary system to work there has to be significant 
incentives for the voluntary initiative. This is informed by the fact that institutions will 
always assess the costs and benefits of possible governance practices and will voluntarily 
adopt practices, including making disclosures that are likely to result in the highest net 
353 Anand A, ' An analysis of enabling vs. mandatory corporate governance structures post sarbanes-oxley' , 
December 2005. < http ://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hj ackson/pdfs/Enabl ing%20governanc.pdf> 
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benefit to them. Thus, the corporate governance regime has to make it abundantly clear 
that voluntarily adopting practices will not be to the detriment of the institution. 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has made a summary of the findings of the study in accordance with the 
objectives set out in Chapter One. It has also made recommendations towards remedying 
the problems identified in Chapter One. In conclusion, the 'comply or explain' approach 
is insufficient in dealing with poor corporate governance practices and thus this study 
calls for either a wholly mandatory governance regime or a partially mandatmy partially 
voluntary regime that is less costly than the wholly mandatory one but still protects 
investors. Additionally, it is my considered view that those at the helm of the institutions 
need to soul search as most of the failures are orchestrated by unethical conduct and not 
by the mere absence of an appropriate governance regime. 
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